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CREATING AROUND COPYRIGHT
Joseph P. Fishman*
It is generally understood that the copyright system constrains downstream creators by
limiting their ability to use protected works in follow-on expression. Those who view
the promotion of creativity as copyright's mission usually consider this constraint to be a
necessary evil at best and an unnecessary one at worst. This conventional wisdom rests
on the seemingly intuitive premise that more creative choice will deliver more creativity.
Yet that premise is belied by both the history of the arts and contemporary psychological
research on the creative process. In fact, creativity flourishes best not under complete
freedom, but rather under a moderate amount of restriction. Drawing from work in
cognitive psychology, management studies, and art history, this Article argues that
contemporary copyright discourse has overlooked constraint's generative upside. The
Article unpacks the concept of constraint into seven characteristics:source, target, scope,
clarity, timing, severity, and polarity. These characteristicsfunction as levers that
determine a given constraint'sgenerative potential. Variation in that potential provides
an underappreciated theoretical justification for areas in which copyright law is
restrictive, such as the exclusive derivative work right, as well as areas where it is
permissive, such as the independent creation and fair use defenses. The Article reveals
that the incentives versus access debate that has long dominated copyright theory has
misunderstood the relationship between creativity and constraint. Information may
want to be free, but creativity does not.
INTRODUCTION

"Art is always the result of constraint. To believe that it rises higher
as it becomes freer is to believe that what keeps a kite from rising is its
string."
- Andr6 Gide, 19041

C opyright
constrains creators. Although the grant of exclusive
rights incentivizes some to produce new information, it also limits
others' ability to use that information as raw material for follow-on
expression. Copyright owners are in most cases entitled to charge any

* Climenko Fellow and Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School. For helpful comments and
suggestions, thanks to Derek Bambauer, Stefan Bechtold, Yochai Benkler, Dan Burk, Noah
Feldman, Terry Fisher, Jeanne Fromer, Erica Goldberg, Wendy Gordon, Craig Joyce, Adriaan
Lanni, Jessica Litman, David Nimmer, Will Ortman, Randy Picker, Ben Roin, Brent Rosso, Jennifer Rothman, Ted Sichelman, Jessica Silbey, Jeannie Suk, Susannah Barton Tobin, Rebecca
Tushnet, and Jonathan Zittrain, along with the participants in the Harvard Law School Climenko
Workshop, the 2014 Munich Conference for Innovation and Competition, the 2014 UCLA Entertainment, Media, and Intellectual Property Colloquium, and the Fourteenth Annual Intellectual
Property Scholars Conference. While I have tried to create around any errors, any that remain
are my own.
1 ANDRE GIDE, The Evolution of the Theater, in MY THEATER 263 (Jackson Matthews
trans., 1952).
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license fee they wish or to refuse to license altogether, so proprietary
information is often burdensome to appropriate lawfully.
To intellectual property scholars, that burden has long been a
common target. On the standard account, copyright protections exist
primarily in order to promote creativity 2 Because creativity is a cumulative process, entitling upstream creators to control downstream
use has traditionally been justified as a necessary evil, socially valuable
only to the extent that it stimulates upstream creation in the first
place. 3 Many believe that this value has been overstated. Our copyright system, the argument goes, ends up stifling more downstream
creativity than is offset by the marginal upstream creativity that the
system incentivizes. 4 Upstream creators would have sufficient motivation to invest in creating even without control of downstream use.
Granting them this control raises downstream creators' costs to the
point where copyright suppresses more marginal creativity than it encourages. If the necessary evil is not really necessary, then our intellectual property system - an instrument intended to be "subservient to
5
the value of creativity" - has become perverse.

2 See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (stating that the
"ultimate aim" of copyright law is "to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good");
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3 d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003) ("The Copyright Act was intended to
promote creativity, thereby benefitting the artist and the public alike."); Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am.
Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983) ("It is a fundamental objective of the copyright law
to foster creativity."); Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1151, 1151 (2007) ("Creativity is universally agreed to be a good that copyright law should
seek to promote .... "); Ned Snow, The Regressing Progress Clause: Rethinking Constitutional
Indifference to Harmful Content in Copyright, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 40 (2Q13) ("[I]n no uncertain terms the Court has articulated a view of copyright that defines the primary objective of
copyright as creativity or originality (which turns on creativity).").
3 See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 69 (2003); Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, Does Intellectual Monopoly Help Innovation?, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 991, 991 (2009); Mark A. Lemley, Ex
Ante Versus Ex Post Justificationsfor Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 131 (2004).
4 See infra section ILA, pp. 1346-51. There are other prominent critiques that I do not take
up in this Article. Among these are the familiar problem that copyright's monopoly rents impose
deadweight loss on society, see, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 3, at ii; the rights-based
argument that the First Amendment entitles downstream creators the liberty to express themselves using elements of others' copyrighted works, see, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Essay, Copy This
Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J.
535 (2004); and the claim that human flourishing requires the capability to participate in cultural
meaning making in ways that copyright law limits, see, e.g., William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168,
192-93 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001). My goal is to address the creativity debate on its own

terms.
5 LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 19 (2004). The same critique, right down to the
master/servant metaphor, can be found in JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 15 (2008),
which argues that "[c]opyright, intended to be the servant of creativity ... is becoming an
obstacle."
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Much of scholars' criticism focuses on the creations that might
have been made if creators had fewer constraints. 6 The existing literature, however, gives little attention to the question of how restrictions
on downstream reuse affect the expressive works that downstream
creators are likely to make. What is the result of pushing those downstream to create around a copyright?
Paradoxically, the result is often new creativity. George Lucas
crafted the plot for Star Wars only after he failed to get a license for a
remake of Flash Gordon. Unable to use the precise creative universe
he initially identified, he distilled particular visual and thematic aspects of that universe and used them to construct the now-familiar setting a long time ago in a galaxy far, far away.7 Video game enthusiasts
have a similar licensing holdup to thank for Donkey Kong and the
birth of the Mario character, which its creator initially intended to be
Popeye.8 Historical accounts of the Fashion Originators' Guild, which
in the 19308 began enforcing private restrictions on copying fashion
designs, report that the prohibitions increased design innovation. 9 Today, many musicians who rely on sampling have developed new, intricate forms of layering and collage in an effort to work around copyright limits on simpler uses of samples.10 A filmmaker finds artistic
inspiration in the search for affordable soundtrack music after his first
choice has proven too expensive.1 1 A poet who riffs off others' texts
finds similar inspiration in having to stay within the boundaries of the
fair use defense. 12 "Rather than limiting my creativity," he says, "these

6 See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 5, at xiv (arguing that, in order to promote creativity, "followon creators and innovators [should] remain as free as possible from the control of the past"). For
other examples, see section ILA, infra pp. 1346-51.
7 J.W. RINZLER, THE MAKING OF STAR WARS 4 (2007).
8 See JEFF RYAN, SUPER MARIO: How NINTENDO CONQUERED AMERICA 23 (2011);
ADAM SUTHERLAND, THE STORY OF NINTENDO 30 (2012); Nick Paumgarten, Master of

Play, NEW YORKER, Dec. 20, 20io, at 86.
9 See C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion, 61
STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1194 & n.192 (2009) (collecting historical sources).
10 See KEMBREW MCLEOD & PETER DICOLA, CREATIVE LICENSE: THE LAW AND CUL-

TURE OF DIGITAL SAMPLING 190-91, 195-96 (2011); Thomas W. Joo, Remix Without Romance,
44 CONN. L. REV. 415, 457-58 (2011); Justin Morey, Copyright Management and ItsEffect on the
Sampling Practice of UK Dance Music Publishers, J. INT'L ASS'N FOR STUDY POP. MUSIC,
2012, at 48, 59.

11 See David Newhoff, Copyright and the Creative Process, THE ILLUSION OF MORE (July 7,
[http://perma.cc/3CAL-KTB 3 ].
12 Austin Kleon, Copyright Law and the Art It Inspires, N.Y. TIMES: ROOM

2013), http://illusionofmore.comcopyright-and-the-creative-process
FOR

DEBATE

(Oct.

1o,

2012),

http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/io/io/does-the-law

-support-inventors-or-investors/copyright-law-and-the-art-it-inspires [http://perma.cc/E4K3PD4W].
Fair use, a judge-made doctrine now codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012), is "'an equitable rule of
reason' which 'permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster."' Stewart v. Abend,
495 U.S. 207, 236 (i99o) (internal citation omitted) (first quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
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'13
[copyright] constraints make the poems better.
These works are the product of a fundamental yet underappreciated fact about the creative process: it thrives best not under complete
freedom, but rather under a moderate amount of restriction. Scratch
the surface of most art forms and you will find a set of rules. Whether
it is the structure and meter of a sonnet, the form of a sonata, the plot
conventions of a Shakespearean comedy, the technique of classical ballet, or the basic shapes of a Cubist painting, art typically has a governing framework, a set of conventions that restricts its subjects while still
allowing a seemingly infinite number of possibilities within those constraints. 14 Constraint's creative power is the central conceit behind the
popular cooking competition Iron Chef, in which participants must
prepare dishes featuring a surprise ingredient. Indeed, competing on
that show is how Amanda Cohen, chef at the popular vegetarian restaurant Dirt Candy in New York City, came up with the idea for the
restaurant's signature dish. 15 Even art that appears to be freeform
and improvisatory is subject to rules. A jazz solo conforms to the
harmony of the accompaniment. Improv comedians perform sketches
revolving around fixed themes. And when artists rebel against a particular framework, they nearly always adopt a new one. 16 Arnold
Schoenberg, for example, famously abandoned tonality in musical
composition, only to adopt the rules of twelve-tone technique. 17 In
each of these cases, the rules that define artistic conventions generate
endless possibilities for exploring the same playing field.1 8

City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984), then quoting Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc.
v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 6o (2d Cir. i98o)).
13 Kleon, supra note 12.
14 See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMIMITMENT,

AND CONSTRAINTS 209-13 (2000); see also Clive James, Hit Men, NEW YORKER, July 7, 1997,
at 70, 72 (noting in reference to movie production budgets that "[t]o accept and transcend limitation can be a source of creative vibrancy, whereas to eliminate it with money almost always leads
to inertia").
15 SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN & ELDAR SHAFIR, SCARCITY: WHY HAVING So LITTLE

MEANS So MUCH 19-20 (2Q13); see also Marc Graser, Fresh Ingredients Infuse "Top Chef," VARIETY (Nov. 6, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://variety.com/2oI2/tv/news/fresh-ingredients-infuse-top-chef

-iii8o61766 [http://perma.cc/KM2D-CRM2] (quoting Top Chef executive producer's view that
the program is about "how the constraints of working with limited ingredients and resources force
you to make more creative choices" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
16 See Philip N. Johnson-Laird, Freedom and Constraint in Creativity, in THE NATURE OF
CREATIVITY 202, 212-13 (Robert J. Sternberg ed., 1988).
17 See MARGARET A. BODEN, THE CREATIVE MIND 95 (2d ed. 2004).
18 See id.; Dean Keith Simonton, Creativity in Personality, Developmental, and Social Psy-

chology: Any Links with Cognitive Psychology?, in CREATIVE THOUGHT 309, 3 11 (Thomas B.
Ward et al. eds., 1997).
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Constraint's generativity extends beyond the arts. 19 Entrepreneurial
firms have begun to embrace constraint as an organizational management philosophy. They have found that having to design around a limitation yields new ideas that would not have emerged as quickly in the
absence of that limitation. 20 That means embracing existing constraints,
like budgets or scarcity of raw materials, as stimuli for unconventional
solutions. It also means voluntarily imposing artificial prohibitions, like a
hypothetical illegalization of an existing business model. 2 1 No less an innovator than Google summed up this attitude in its oft-repeated principle
that "[c]reativity loves constraint. '22 Marissa Mayer, an architect of that
principle at Google and now-CEO of Yahoo!, has stated that "[c]reativity
thrives best when constrained," attributing Google's innovation in soft23
ware to the company's need to satisfy a heterogeneous consumer base.
That a decrease in creative freedom could yield an increase in creative production is a process already well known to psychologists. In
both controlled experiments and fieldwork, researchers have found
that a moderate amount of constraint increases creativity 24 Limitlessness lets us default, sometimes unconsciously, to what we have seen before. As one researcher put it, "[wlithout constraints, composition
19 1 adopt here Professor Jonathan Zittrain's definition of generativity as "a system's capacity
to produce unanticipated change through unfiltered contributions from broad and varied audiences." JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET - AND HOW TO STOP IT
70 (2008) (emphasis omitted).
20 See, e.g., CHRIS BILTON, MANAGEMENT AND CREATIVITY 77-85 (2007); JEFF DYER ET AL.,
THE INNOVATOR'S DNA 78-79 (2011); Michael Gibbert et al., In Praise of Resource Constraints, 48
MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 15 (2007); Scott Dadich, Design Under Constraint:How Limits Boost Creativity, WIRED, Feb. 23, 2009, http://archive.wired.com/culture/design/magazine/i7-03/dpintro [http://
perma.cc/98JB-ZXLZ]; Henry Doss, Innovation: A Tale of Language, Marissa Mayer Francis Bacon
and the Sonnet, FORBES (Mar. 4, 2013, io:oo AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/henrydoss/20r3/03/04
/innovation-a-tale-of-language-marissa-mayer-francis-bacon-and-the-sonnet [http://perma.cc/YBT8
-LKHT]; Bill Fischer, Don't Relax Constraints,Embrace Them, FORBES (Jan. 9, 2012, 4:25 AM), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/billfischer/2or2/or/og/dont-relax-constraints-embrace-them [http://perma.cc
/4 MNZ- 4 ZEH]; Matthew E. May, How Intelligent Constraints Drive Creativity, HARV. Bus. REV.
(Jan. 30, 2013), http://blogs.hbr.org/20I3/0i/how-intelligent-constraints-dr [http://perma.cc/MXP3
-K6ZQ]; Uri Neren, The Number One Key to Innovation: Scarcity, HARV. Bus. REV. (Jan. 14, 2011),
http://blogs.hbr.org/2or /or/the-number-one-key-to-innovati [https://perma.cc/CgHN-S7V9]; David
Sturt, Creativity: How ConstraintsDrive Genius, FORBES (July 12, 2013, 1:32 PM), http://www.forbes
.comsites/groupthink/20r3/07/r2/creativity-how-constraints-drive-genius [http://perma.cc/YgBT-6WFB].
21 See, e.g., DYER ET AL., supra note 20, at 78-79.
22 Id. (quoting Marissa Mayer).
23 Marissa Ann Mayer, Creativity Loves Constraints, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 12,
2oo6), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2oo6-02- 2/creativity-loves-constraints [http://perma.cc
N2MZ-PJRg]. Jeff Bezos, CEO of Amazon.com, adopts a similar stance. In its early days, Amazon
had scarce capital. That scarcity stimulated Amazon's development of its associates program, a cheap
but effective way to drive traffic to its website. "[F]rugality," Bezos explained, "drives innovation, just
like other constraints do. One of the only ways to get out of a fight box is to invent your way out."
Bezos on Innovation, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. r6, 2oo8), http://www.businessweek
.com/stories/2008-04- i6/bezos-on-innovation [http://perma.cc/L2V2-4ETV].
24 See infra section II.B, pp. 1362-69.
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takes place in a cul-de-sac of the customary (a familiar subject) and
the successful (a style worth an 'A' in the past, in this class). '25 Constraint mitigates this phenomenon. When the mind is forced to navigate within limits and around obstacles, it is less likely to revert to
previous solutions. Because human imagination benefits from adding
a bit of resistance to the path of least resistance, freedom and creativity often work at cross-purposes.
Copyright scholarship has neglected constraint's generative upside
for the production of creative expression downstream. This Article
fills that gap. In doing so, it moves beyond the long-running debate in
utilitarian copyright discourse that has pit the value of downstream
creativity against the need for upstream incentives. Both sides of that
debate have embraced a tradeoff starker than need actually exist.
Copyright restrictions that produce upstream incentives, like so many
other constraints under which creators work, can themselves stimulate
creativity Indeed, copyright excludability can do directly what other
constraints can only do obliquely: limit access to the most familiar
solutions.
To be sure, there is such a thing as counterproductive constraint.
Psychologists describe a curvilinear relationship between creativity
and constraint: increasing constraint up to a point increases creative
output, but past that point, any further increases will cause that output to drop off.2 6 Locating that point on the constraint axis is the key
to optimizing a cumulative creativity regime, and this Article offers a
theoretical model for how to approach the question.
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I introduces the definition
of creativity that I employ here. Part II reviews the place of creative
workarounds in intellectual property discourse. Patent commentary
going back over fifty years has acknowledged the potential social value
in stimulating efforts to develop alternatives to existing technology
The basic insight is that the patentee's right to exclude triggers a virtuous cycle in which one invention begets a competing and sometimes
even better invention. Copyright scholarship has paid comparatively
little attention to that potential for expressive works. And in neither
field have scholars considered how constraint can benefit innovators
during the creative process.
Part III surveys the substantial psychology and management literature on creativity under constraint. Building off of that literature, Part
25 Patricia D. Stokes, Using Constraints to Generate and Sustain Novelty, r PSYCHOL. AESTHETICS, CREATIVITY, & ARTS 107, 107 (2007).

26 See infra section II.B, pp. 1362-69; see also ELSTER, supra note 14, at 212-13 (observing a
curvilinear relationship from perspective of aesthetic theory); Sandra Ohly et al., Routinization,
Work Characteristicsand Their Relationships with Creative and Proactive Behaviors, 27 J. ORG.
BEHAV. 257 (2006) (finding curvilinear relationship between time pressure and creativity).
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IV develops a model that theorizes when constraints are likely to help
and when they are likely to hurt. Because different kinds of constraint
affect creativity in different ways, the model here envisions constraint
as a combination of several qualitative variables: source, target, scope,
clarity, timing, severity, and polarity. A given constraint's generative
potential depends on the way it mixes these variables. The inquiry
therefore involves asking not only how much but also what kind of
constraint is at issue.
Part V uses this model as a lens through which to assess both existing copyright law and potential revisions to it. The degree of a constraint's generativity provides an underappreciated theoretical justification for areas in which copyright law is restrictive, such as the
exclusive derivative work right, as well as areas where it is permissive,
such as the independent creation and fair use defenses. At the same
time, my analysis suggests several ways to make existing copyright
constraints more generative than they already are. First, legal actors
should make the boundaries of copyright owners' entitlements less
fuzzy. Cumulative creativity would be better off with at least some
bright lines within an area of law defined almost entirely by ambiguous standards that discourage create-around efforts. Second, even
where particular adaptations are infringing, courts should take care
not to prohibit the artistic processes that generated them. Creating
around product constraints is both more feasible and more engaging
than creating around process constraints. Third, because constraints
enable creativity best when artists perceive them as challenges to be
overcome rather than burdens to be borne, the most generative copyright restrictions will likely be those that creators intrinsically respect.
This underscores the importance of avoiding policies likely to stoke
popular backlash. For creators who find inspiration in navigating other constraints but not in navigating copyright, the problem may have
as much to do with sociocultural factors as it does with the objective
qualities of the constraint itself.

I. A BRIEF DEFINITION OF CREATIVITY
In order to measure creativity, one must first be able to recognize it.
Copyright doctrine is not well equipped to handle that task, but psychology is. In order to understand the creative process better, legal
scholars have in recent years begun to mine the psychological litera27
ture for insight that economic models have not been able to provide.
27 See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. 1441
(2010) (protectability thresholds); Gregory N. Mandel, Left-Brain Versus Right-Brain: Competing
Conceptions of Creativity in Intellectual Property Law, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283 (2010) (joint
creation); Erez Reuveni, Copyright, Neuroscience, and Creativity, 64 ALA. L. REV. 735 (2o13) (ac-
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These findings illuminate intellectual property policy in two ways.
First, simply enough, they reveal how creators go about the process of
creation. Second, as Professor Jeanne Fromer has emphasized, they
can fill the gap left by researchers' inability to gather reliable data on
how intellectual property affects innovation outcomes. 28 Because it
has proven so difficult to show a causal link between intellectual property incentives and particular results on the ground, psychological research can at least inform policymakers about how to encourage crea29
tive thinking.
Psychologically, there is no difference between scientific creativity
and artistic creativity; the mechanisms are the same. 30 In each domain, creativity lies in the generation of a product or idea that satisfies
two criteria: originality and appropriateness.31
The first criterion
tracks whether the product is new in some significant way, while the
second criterion tracks whether it has some social value (as creativity
scholar Keith Sawyer notes, "many dreams are novel but rarely have
any impact on the world after breakfast" 32). Both are measured
according to the consensus of a particular community.33 What is

cess to information). For a creativity scholar's introduction of the field to a patent law audience,
see R. Keith Sawyer, Creativity, Innovation, and Obviousness, 12 LEWIS & CLARK. L. REV. 461
(2008).

28 Fromer, supra note 27, at 1444, 1458-59. Although the intellectual property literature has
recently begun to distinguish between the terms "innovation" and "creativity," see, e.g., Doris Estelle Long, Crossing the Innovation Divide, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 507, 511 n.14 (2008), most scholars
continue to use them interchangeably, see Gaia Bernstein, In the Shadow of Innovation, 31
CARDOZO L. REV. 2257, 2271-72 (2010). My analysis here follows the latter convention.

29 Fromer, supra note 27, at 1444, 1458-59.
30 See TERESA M. AMABILE, CREATIVITY IN CONTEXT 34 (1996) ("[T]here is one basic
form of creativity, one basic quality of products that observers are responding to when they call
something 'creative,' whether they are working in science or the arts."). For summaries of the
literature showing that the creative process operates similarly across both scientific and artistic
domains, see Fromer, supra note 27, at 1444; Mandel, supra note 27, at 331.
31 See, e.g., DEAN KEITH SIMONTON, ORIGINS OF GENIUS 5-6 (1999); Teresa M. Amabile,
The Social Psychology of Creativity: A Componential Conceptualization, 45 J. PERSONALITY &
SoC. PSYCHOL. 357, 358-59 (1983); Richard E. Mayer, Fifty Years of Creativity Research, in
HANDBOOK OF CREATIVITY 449, 449 (Robert J. Sternberg ed., 1999); Sawyer, supra note 27, at
462; Morris I. Stein, A Transactional Approach to Creativity, in THE 1955 UNIVERSITY OF
UTAH RESEARCH CONFERENCE ON THE IDENTIFICATION OF CREATIVE SCIENTIFIC
TALENT 172 (Calvin W. Taylor ed., 1955) (defining creativity as "that process which results in 'a
novel work that is accepted as tenable or useful or satisfying by a group at some point in time"'
(citation omitted)); Robert J. Sternberg & Todd I. Lubart, The Concept of Creativity: Prospects
and Paradigms,in HANDBOOK OF CREATIVITY, supra, at 3, 3.
32 Sawyer, supra note 27, at 462.
33 AMABILE, supra note 30, at 33-37; SIMONTON, supra note 31, at 6. According to this definition, a creator's independent invention of an existing product is original, even if another creator
in a different place may have come up with the idea first. Professor Dean Simonton gives the example of Galileo's discovery of sunspots, which was novel to Europeans although the Chinese had
discovered them a thousand years earlier. SIMONTON, supra note 31, at 6.
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new and appropriate is that which the audience deems new and
3 4
appropriate.
Legal scholars have recently noted this definition's conceptual similarity to patent law's novelty and utility requirements. s 5 The definition meshes well with copyright requirements, too. Originality is, after
all, "[tihe sine qua non of copyright. '3 6 And the appropriateness re37
quirement demands only that an audience find value in the product,
whether it be the technological value of a better mousetrap or the entertainment value of The Mousetrap.3s Appropriateness thus encompasses the sort of aesthetic utility that one nineteenth-century copyright decision identified when it explained, "[w]hatever is beautiful is
useful, because beauty gives pleasure, and pleasure is a kind of happi'3 9
ness, and happiness is the ultimate object of the use of all things.
Since the arbiter of value is the audience, the psychological definition
of creativity evokes "intellectual property's aim of giving protection for
products that are requisitely new, while leaving to society the question
'40
of how valuable the product ought to be considered.
Whether a task is susceptible to a creative approach depends on
whether the task is well structured or ill structured. 4 1 A wellstructured problem is one that may be solved algorithmically based on
definite and available criteria. The statement of the problem dictates a
path to the solution. Jigsaw puzzles, standardized tests, and crosswords are all examples of well-structured problems. There is no room
for originality, and hence no room for creativity, in naming an eightletter phrase beginning with the letter S that identifies a short-lived

34 SIMONTON, supra note 31, at 6.
35 See Fromer, supra note 27, at 1484-85; Mandel, supra note 27, at 334-35; see also John C.
Huber, Invention and Inventivity Is a Random, Poisson Process: A Potential Guide to Analysis of
General Creativity, ii CREATIVITY RES. J. 231, 232 (1998) ("Some commonly accepted definitions of creativity closely parallel those of patents ....");
cf Mandel, supra note 27, at 334 n.21 I
("[T]he consensual definition tracks [patent law's] nonobviousness requirement."). Patent law's
novelty requirement is nonetheless stricter than psychologists' in that it excludes independent creation of an existing invention. Fromer, supra note 27, at 1486.
36 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
37 Fromer, supra note 27, at 1459-6o; Mandel, supra note 27, at 335; Sawyer, supra note 27, at
462.

38 See

AGATHA CHRISTIE,

THE MOUSETRAP

(1952);

see also Mouse Trap (Game),

WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mouse-Tap-(game) (last visited Feb. 1, 2015) [http://
perma.cc/36WS-E 7 7 P].
39 Henderson v. Tompkins, 6o F. 758, 763 (C.C.D. Mass. 1894) (quoting ALBERT HENRY
WALKER, WALKER ON PATENTS) (internal quotation mark omitted).

40 Fromer, supra note 27, at 1461.
41 The distinction was explored in detail in Herbert A. Simon, The Structure of Ill Structured
Problems, 4 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

181 (1973).

See also PATRICIA D. STOKES, CREA-

TIVITY FROM CONSTRAINTS 4-6 (2006); ROBERT D.

WEISBERG, CREATIVITY: UNDER-

STANDING INNOVATION IN PROBLEM SOLVING, SCIENCE, INVENTION, AND THE ARTS
138-40 (2006).

20151

CREATING AROUND COPYRIGHT

11343

1765 statute.4 2
An ill-structured problem, by contrast, offers no
straightforward path to solution. Because an ill-structured problem
fails to specify all information necessary for an appropriate result, it
must be solved heuristically, not algorithmically 43 Writing a law review article, for instance, is an ill-structured task. So is composing a
sonata, deciding how to invest money, finding a cure for a disease, or
designing a building. 44 Unless these tasks are governed by paint-bynumber-style instructions, there is no fully predictable way to accom45
plish them.
46
It is within ill-structured problem spaces that creativity emerges.
Where the path to a solution is unknown at the outset, there is opportunity for a new and appropriate take on things. Creators need to
bump around the problem space searching for an answer, a process
that is obviated where the range of possible answers is foreordained.
Copyright law implicitly reflects this distinction between ill-structured
and well-structured problems through its merger doctrine.4 7 This doctrine denies copyright protection where an underlying idea can be expressed in a predictably limited number of ways (the idea and expression have, in essence, "merged"). 48 In those situations, the problem is
well structured, precluding the exercise of creativity that copyright
protection is intended to promote.
The path to the goal is not the only part of an ill-structured problem that can be uncertain. Sometimes the goal itself is incompletely
49
specified, awaiting development or discovery by the problem solver.
Early Cubists, for example, did not start out with a clear idea of what

42 See Stamp Act, 5 Geo. 3, c. 12 (1765), repealed by 6 Geo. 3, c. 11 (1766). Apologies to any
readers still working on 41-Across in the Los Angeles Times daily crossword from February 9,
2014.

43 AMABILE, supra note 30, at 35.

44 Architecture is Professor Herbert Simon's paradigmatic example: "There is initially no definite criterion to test a proposed solution, much less a mechanizeable process to apply the criterion.
The problem space is not defined in any meaningful way, for a definition would have to encompass all kinds of structures the architect might at some point consider .... " Simon, supra note 41,
at 187-88.
45 Professor Teresa Amabile illustrates this distinction by comparing two chemists synthesizing
a new hydrocarbon complex: The first applies a familiar step-by-step process, while the second
has to devise that process for the first time. Although in either case the product may be both new
and appropriate, only the second process is creative. AMABILE, supra note 3o, at 36.
46
47
leads
48

See id. at 35-36; STOKES, supra note 41, at 4.
See Fromer, supra note 27, at 1495 (noting that merger doctrine applies when a problem
"directly and obviously" to its solution with little creativity required).
See, e.g., Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458, 1463-64 (5th

Cir. r9go); Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (ist Cir. 1967).
49 AMABILE, supra note 30, at 35-36 (observing that many "heuristic tasks do not have clearly
defined solutions or goals, and it is part of the problem-solver's task to identify them").
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artistic problems their nascent style was meant to address. 5 0 The destination, let alone the route to get there, was unfixed.
That a task's goal can be ill structured has led many theorists to
treat not just problem solving but also problem finding as a locus of
creativity. While creative problem solving involves generating a new
and appropriate answer to an already identified problem, creative
problem finding involves "discover[ing] the problem and first pos[ing]
the question in such a way that it lends itself to solution. 5 1 A scientist
who identifies a new use for an existing product or process is a creative problem finder, as is an artist who chooses a new subject to explore. 5 2 Creativity scholar Jacob Getzels illustrates this concept using
a hypothetical driver who blows a tire on a backcountry road only to
discover that he has no tire jack in the trunk. If he sets off in search
of a tire jack, he has formulated the problem uncreatively; if, by contrast, he searches his surroundings for another way to raise the car off
the ground, he has formulated it creatively.5 3 The uncreative problem
finder wanders for miles seeking a service station, while the creative
problem finder realizes that he can use the pulley at the barn fortuitously located across the street.5 4 While many associate creativity
most with problem solving, creativity in problem finding is just as important.5 5 Problem finding affects the trajectory of problem solving.
As Einstein and Infeld put it: "The formulation of a problem is often
more essential than its solution, which may be merely a matter of
mathematical or experimental skill. To raise new questions, new possibilities, to regard old problems from a new angle, requires creative
'5 6
imagination and marks real advance in science.
While this model of creativity is intuitive enough when applied to
science, the notion of artistic "problems" to be found and solved might
at first seem puzzling.5 7 Most of us do not tend to view expressive
50 STOKES, supra note 41, at 4; WEISBERG, supra note 41, at 580, 583-84.

51 Sawyer, supra note 27, at 474; see also AMABILE, supra note 3o, at 35-36. For an in-depth
exploration of creative problem finding, see the essays in PROBLEM FINDING, PROBLEM SOLVING, AND CREATIVITY (Mark A. Runco ed., 1994).
52 See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 27, at I463 (giving example of Picasso's Guernica); J.W.
Getzels, The Problem of the Problem, in NEW DIRECTIONS FOR METHODOLOGY OF SOCIAL
AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 37, 42 (R. Hogarth ed., 1982) (giving example of Matisse, who "set

himself the problem of painting grass red and roses green"); Sawyer, supra note 27, at 473-74 (giving examples of laparoscopic surgery and Post-It notes).
53 Getzels, supra note 52, at 38-39.
54 Id.
55 Sawyer, supra note 27, at 473 ("[H]istorically, the most radical breakthroughs result from
problem finding creativity.").
56 ALBERT EINSTEIN & LEOPOLD INFELD, THE EVOLUTION OF PHYSICS 95 (1938); see

also MAX WERTHEIMER, PRODUCTIVE THINKING 123 (1945) ("Often in great discoveries the

most important thing is that a certain question is found. Envisaging, putting the productive question is often more important, often a greater achievement than solution of a set question ... .
57 Fromer, supra note 27, at 1467 (noting this conceptual difficulty).
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works, even great ones, as solutions to problems. Yet that is, at bottom, what they are. The artist's problem, according to Getzels and fellow creativity expert Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, is how to translate life
experiences into an expressive medium and to "reveal[] meanings that
were not perceived before the work of art was completed. 58 1 Defining
and overcoming that challenge infuses all artistic decisions, from formulating the goal of a project to selecting its thematic content to picking the physical materials for its execution. 59 A solution to an expressive problem could be depicting a recognizable subject in a way that
will produce a particular impact (say, the barbarism conveyed in Picasso's Guernica or Stravinsky's Rite of Spring), representing old
themes in a new style (Monet's development of Impressionism, or
Braque and Picasso's development of Cubism), developing a new goal
(Mondrian's move to nonrepresentational art), or deploying an effective rhetorical tool for advocacy (Swift's use of satire in A Modest Proposal).60 Not every artistic problem will involve a clearly defined goal,
and not every artist will approach a task with a goal already in
mind. 61 In all cases of creative expression, however, the artist formulates a problem and produces expression intended to solve it.62
Do copyright law's infringement restrictions promote creativitythat is, novel and appropriate solutions to ill-defined problems downstream? As the next Part shows, copyright scholarship has often
viewed these restrictions as a threat to creative production. Yet, as I
explain below, they may produce the opposite result.

II. CREATIVITY AND CONSTRAINT IN COPYRIGHT THEORY
Intellectual property rights yield a well-recognized static inefficiency by granting firms exclusive rights that allow them to price informational goods above their marginal cost of production. The resulting
deadweight loss is traditionally thought to be tolerable because it
comes with a dynamic efficiency: inducing firms to invest in creative
projects that they would not have pursued without the means to exclude imitators who could free ride off that investment. But this dynamic efficiency also carries with it a potential dynamic inefficiency.
Innovation is cumulative. In both science and art, the creations of to-

58 JACOB W.

GETZELS

& MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI,

THE CREATIVE

VISION 154

(1976).
59 WEISBERG, supra note 41, at 583-84 (discussing problem finding in the visual arts); see also
Fromer, supra note 27, at 1467.
60 See STOKES, supra note 41, at 5-6, 33-38, ro8- 1; WEISBERG, supra note 41, at 577-84.
61 See WEISBERG, supra note 41, at 139-40 (describing a painter who begins work at an "easel without any specific idea of what she wanted to paint, knowing only that she wanted to

work").
62 See Fromer, supra note 27, at 1467.
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day will become raw material for the creations of tomorrow. 63 That
the goods protected by intellectual property are not only one's present
output but also another's future input means that too much exclusivity
can impede the production of new goods over time. As a result, any
exclusive right should be large enough to induce investment in creativity upstream but not so large that it unnecessarily inhibits creativity
downstream.
How legal constraint affects innovation is a question with which
both copyright and patent scholars have struggled. Yet the two groups
treat the issue in surprisingly different ways. Patent commentary has
had a robust debate over the social value of stimulating effort to develop alternatives to existing technology - "inventing around," in
patent parlance. Copyright theory lacks a similarly developed discussion over the downstream benefits of circumventing protected works.
With the occasional exception, discussed below, commentators in the
copyright space have tended to focus on upstream incentives as the only potential casualty of downstream choice. This Part first surveys
how copyright's constraints have been analyzed. It then turns to the
concept of "inventing around" within the patent literature and explores
whether that concept can do meaningful work in a utilitarian account
of copyright's effects.
A. The Constraint Critique
The extent of copyright law's constraint on downstream creators
depends chiefly on two of the owner's exclusive rights: the right to reproduce a copyrighted work 64 and the right to prepare "derivative
works" from it.65 Courts have interpreted the reproduction right
broadly. It guards against not just copying an entire work (say, photocopying a book), but also against nonverbatim copying that yields a
66
work deemed to be "substantially similar" to protected expression.
Copying particular narrative elements like character and plot details
may suffice. 67 So may appropriating the "total concept and feel" of the
63 The sources on this point are legion. See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d
1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) ("Nothing
today, likely nothing since we tamed fire, is genuinely new: Culture, like science and technology,
grows by accretion, each new creator building on the works of those who came before."); LANDES
& POSNER, supra note 3, at 66-68 (noting that because "[c]reating a new expressive work typically involves borrowing or building on material from a prior body of works," id. at 66-67, less copyright protection means lower costs of expression).
64 17 U.S.C. § ro6(r) (2012).
65 Id. § 1O6(2).
66 See generally ROBERT C. OSTERBERG & ERIC C. OSTERBERG, SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY IN COPYRIGHT LAW § 1:1 (2o14); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in
Copyright Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 203, 214-33 (2Q12).

67 See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1936) (concluding that pervasive copying of dramatic elements may constitute infringement); Metro-
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copyrighted work, whether it is a television program, greeting card,
song, or Halloween mask. 68 Copying even a quantitatively small por69
tion of the protected work may be enough to infringe.
The derivative work right protects against preparation of "a work
based upon one or more preexisting works. ' 70 In practice, this right
does little that the capacious reproduction right has not done already.
Because any derivative will incorporate some independently copyrightable element of the original work, an infringement of the deriva71
tive work right will usually infringe the reproduction right as well.
Thus, in the average case of downstream adaptation, it may not matter
whether the accused work is analyzed under the reproduction right or
72
the derivative work right.
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1297-99 (C.D. Cal. 1995)
(holding that a car commercial involving a James Bond-type protagonist likely infringed the
copyright in the James Bond character); Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDKGX, i989 WL
2o6431, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, i989) (holding that copyrights in the characters from the Rocky
film franchise were infringed by an unauthorized plot outline for a new sequel).
68 Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 73', 733 (4 th Cir. i99o); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167 ( 9 th Cir. 1977); Roth Greeting Cards
v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d iio6, iio ( 9 th Cir. i97o); BSS Studio Inc. v. Kmart Corp., No. 98 C
6298, iggg WL 1427831, at *i (N.D. Ill. Dec. 21, Iggg).
69 See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548-49 (1985) (several hundred words from a five-hundred-page book); Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films,
41o F. 3 d 792, 796 (6th Cir. 2005) (two-second sample of sound recording).
70 17 U.S.C. § joj.
71 Cf. H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 6:
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL 17 (Comm. Print 1965) (noting that
while a broad reproduction right might render a separate derivative work right unnecessary,
"omit[ting] any specific mention of it would be likely to cause uncertainty and misunderstanding"). Some courts and commentators have even concluded that the derivative work right as currently interpreted is superfluous. See Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d
1366, 1373 (2d Cir. 1993); MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.o9[A] (2012); Michael Abramowicz, A Theory of Copyright's Derivative Right and Related Doctrines, 90 MINN. L. REV. 317, 334-35 (2005); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. r, 50 (2002). For a discussion of the infrequent
instances in which the derivative work right can do what the reproduction right cannot, see Mark
A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989,
1018-19 (1997).

72 See, e.g., Well-Made Toy Mfg. Corp. v. Goffa Int'l Corp., 354 F.3 d 112, 117 (2d Cir. 2003),
abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elseiver, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010) (noting that
the same "substantial similarity" test applies whether the defendant's product is analyzed as a reproduced work or a derivative work); Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 ( 9 th Cir. 1984)
(stating that the derivative work standard examines whether the accused work "would be considered an infringing work if the material which it has derived from a prior work had been taken
without the consent of a copyright proprietor of such prior work" (quoting United States v. Taxe,
540 F.2d 961, 965 n.2 ( 9 th Cir. 1976) (emphasis added)) (internal quotation mark omitted)). For
recent arguments concerning the proper limits of the derivative work right, see generally Daniel
Gervais, The Derivative Right, or Why Copyright Law Protects Foxes Better than Hedgehogs, 15
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 785 (2013); Pamela Samuelson, The Quest for a Sound Conception of
Copyright's Derivative Work Right, ioi GEO. L.J. 1505 (2013).
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Conceptual redundancy aside, the range of nonliteral copying that
these exclusive rights cover leaves no doubt that "copyright law is intended to reach improvers as well as counterfeiters. 7 3 Subject to the
fair use defense, downstream creators who invent new but unlicensed
twists and turns on copyrighted material are infringers. Copyright law
limits how these creators may construct their expression.
Some justify that limitation on natural rights grounds, appealing to
theories of Lockean desert and Hegelian personhood interests. 4 Looking beyond the creator's personal stake, however, what does society get
out of restricting downstream use? The dominant utilitarian analysis
has come to be known as copyright's "incentives/access" tradeoff,
weighing upstream incentives to create against downstream access to
the work.7 5 The standard case for derivative works exclusivity encompasses several arguments, all of which look upstream.7 6 The first
argument, which the Supreme Court emphasized in Campbell v. AcuffRose Music, Inc.,7 7 concerns whether the upstream creator will produce the original work to begin with.78 Since derivative markets offer
authors additional revenue streams on top of the primary market for
the underlying work, giving them exclusive access to those derivative
markets may spur investment in the underlying work.7 9 A second ar73 Lemley, supra note 71, at io19.
74 See, e.g., Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving to Own Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 609, 6 io-i I993); Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual Property, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81 (1998) (analyzing three kinds of personality interests underlying intellectual property).
75 See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 3, at i, 22-24, 66-67; Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.,
Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm,49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 492-98 (1996). The
"access" side of the tradeoff encompasses not just adaptive users interested in producing follow-on
expression, but also nonadaptive users interested primarily in consuming the work. Id. at 497-98.
Reading a book, listening to a song, and seeing a movie are each more expensive if a copyright
owner has the ability to charge consumers a supracompetitive price. This Article focuses on
adaptive access, the form most directly related to the promotion of creativity. But cf. Jessica
Litman, Creative Reading, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2007, at 175, 179-80 (arguing that
reading, listening, and viewing are themselves acts of creativity).
76 For a thorough overview of, and critical responses to, the arguments presented here, see
Derek E. Bambauer, Faulty Math: The Economics of Legalizing The Grey Album, 59 ALA. L.
REV. 345, 357-91 (2008) (critiquing upstream justifications for the derivative work right).
77 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
71 Id. at 593 ("[T]he licensing of derivatives is an important economic incentive to the creation
of originals.").
79 See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Creationand Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works
of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, I91o-II (i99o) ("Potential derivative works exploitations are often taken into account in the decision whether to make the initial investment in a
work's creation .... A broad scope of protection, thus, may favor the broader production of
works ....");Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 209, 216 (1983) (arguing that copyright's derivative work right "enables
prospective copyright owners to proportion their investment in a work's expression to the returns
expected not only from the market in which the copyrighted work is first published, but from other, derivative markets as well").
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gument asks not whether but when the upstream creator will produce
the work. Without an exclusive adaptation right, perhaps the author
of an original work would rush adaptations to market, even though
society would be better off if she waited and gauged demand for the
original.8 0 On this theory, the derivative work right corrects potential
distortions in the scheduling of derivative works' publication, what
Professor Michael Abramowicz has called "a tool that allows authors
to take their time." ' A third argument focuses on the copyright owner's ability to price discriminate. 2 By splintering the right to adapt a
work from the right to copy it, copyright owners can name one price to
ordinary consumers and another price to adapters, who may be willing
to pay more. This allows owners to sort buyers according to their intended use, theoretically increasing revenue while minimizing deadweight loss.
So far, so good. But when attention shifts downstream, to the "access" side of the tradeoff, many prominent commentators see a steep
cost in the form of a less creative culture. They argue that, whatever
the benefits occurring upstream, giving copyright owners more control
over nonliteral copying means getting less cultural innovation downstream. 3 On this popular view, the incentives/access tradeoff is lopsided. The need for access overwhelms the need for incentives. The
upshot is that our regime is backward. Instead of catalyzing creativity,
copyright calcifies it. If we could compensate creators adequately
while minimizing restrictions downstream, creativity would be better
off. But in our world of copyright constraint, what might have been
follow-on expression is never expressed. 4 Copyright has become the
law of missed opportunities.

80 E.g., Randal C. Picker, Fair Use vs. Fair Access, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 603, 613-14
(2008); see also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 3, at 11o (noting a similar potential timing distortion in which the author of an original work "delay[s] publishing it until he ha[s] created the derivative works as well").
81 Abramowicz, supra note 71, at 320.
82 See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 75, at 631.
See generally Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law
and Price Discrimination,23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55 (20cr).
83 See, e.g., Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983) (observing
that although "[i]t
is a fundamental objective of the copyright law to foster creativity," the substantial similarity inquiry's downstream effects have the capacity to "diminish the prospects for
creativity"); Christina Bohannan, Taming the Derivative Works Right: A Modest Proposalfor Reducing Overbreadth and Vagueness in Copyright, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 669, 675 (2010).
84 See LESSIG, supra note 5, at 104-o6 (questioning how much "creativity is never made just
because the costs of clearing the rights are so high," id. at 104); id. at 185-88 (lamenting this loss
of creativity); id. at 249 ("When you focus the issue on lost creativity, people can see the copyright
system makes no sense."); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Creativity, Improvisation, and Risk: Copyright
and Musical Innovation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1829, 1840 (2011) (arguing that today's copyright would have "inhibited creativity by composers such as Bach and Mozart," who "borrowed
extensively in their works").
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These missed opportunities drive an intuitively appealing case
against limiting downstream use of protected information. An early
evangelist was Richard Stallman, founder of the free software movement.85 Professor Lawrence Lessig introduced Stallman's ethos of unconstrained innovation to a broader audience in his 2004 book Free
Culture, advocating for an intellectual property system in which
"follow-on creators and innovators remain as free as possible from the
control of the past. '8 6 In the decade since, a growing number of scholars have voiced concern that copyright restrictions are stifling downstream creativity. Professor Laura Heymann, for example, describes
the common view that restrictions on the public domain are necessarily "restrictions on creativity" and that "[a] creator who has some limitations on the 'raw materials' he can use to create is thwarted in the
creative process."8' 7 Similarly, Professor Wendy Gordon writes that
creativity will have difficulty "surviving" the calculus of navigating licensing constraints,88 and Professor Lydia Loren contends that licensing costs lead to the creation of works that are "not as culturally rich
or as authentic as they could have been if the costs of reuse were lower."8 9 Similar critiques abound. 90 Anthropologist Christopher Kelty
epitomizes perhaps the strongest form of this sentiment, albeit applied
to technological innovation, in his opening statement at a recent debate on the patent system: "[W]hat is the oxygen of innovation? What
is it that keeps innovation alive from moment to moment and what is
it that can be stifling? ... I submit that the oxygen of innovation is
freedom. Freedom to operate, freedom to experiment, freedom from

85 See RICHARD M. STALLMAN, FREE SOFTWARE, FREE SOCIETY 32, 50 (2d ed. 2010); cf.

Clark D. Asay, A Case for the Public Domain, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 753, 755 (2o13) (noting that the
free software movement is based on the theory that "freedom of use fosters increased collaboration, which in turn spurs inventive and creative activity").
86 LESSIG, supra note 5, at xiv. Lessig, like some others, is also concerned about a separate set
of social costs besides depriving audiences of creative works. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX
92 (2008) (arguing that even if most remix products would be unappealing to consumers, they are
still valuable insofar as they allow individual speakers to express their ideas); see also, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 5I WM. & MARY L.
REV. 513, 537 (2009) ("[C]reativity is a positive virtue, not just because of its results but because
of how the process of making meaning contributes to human flourishing."). For more on these
other costs, see supra note 4.
87 Laura A. Heymann, The Trademark/Copyright Divide, 6o SMU L. REV. 55, 85 (2007).
88 Wendy J. Gordon, Authors, Publishers, and Public Goods: Trading Gold for Dross, 36 LoY.
L.A. L. REV. '59, 191 (2002).
89 Lydia Pallas Loren, The Pope's Copyright? Aligning Incentives with Reality by Using Creative Motivation to Shape Copyright Protection, 69 LA. L. REV. 1, 14 (2008).
90 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 2, at I IgI-92 (arguing that the creative process demands broad
freedom in order to generate the unexpected). But cf. Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent Author, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5 (pointing to the
generativity of constraint in arguing that works authored through artificial intelligence should be
copyrightable).
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constraint and control, freedom to fail." 9 1 On this account, legal restriction on downstream use of information is at best a necessary and significant - evil for the creation of expressive works.
B. Inventing Around and CreatingAround
Patent theory offers a more optimistic view of the relationship between creativity and constraint. Courts and commentators have recognized the process of inventing around patents as a generative source
of, rather than a stifling impediment to, creativity One of the earliest
and most enthusiastic proponents was Judge Evan Alfred Evans of the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. In a pair of cases from the
early 1940s, he endorsed inventing around as an engine of competition
that ultimately hastens technological progress.
First, in James P Marsh Corp. v. U.S. Gauge Co., 92 the court was
faced with a defendant who had tried to invent around a patented
component of a steam pressure gauge. 93 The accused device successfully performed the patented invention's function while omitting one
of the elements disclosed in the patent claims. 94 The lower court had
held that the defendant's device, although beyond the literal scope of
95
the claims, nevertheless infringed under the doctrine of equivalents.
96
The Court of Appeals reversed.
Writing for the court, Judge Evans
posited that the patent system "spurs the competitors to put forth their
best effort to produce a product as good, yet different from the patentee's." 97 He noted that this circumvention effort often absorbs as
much creative energy as "the conception or development of invention
itself."98 When such redirection of effort occurs:
[T]he patent system is working at its best. For it is then that we have
competition between a holder of a legal monopoly and his competitors. It
illustrates how the legal monopoly evidenced by a patent excites the competitors to their best to meet or excel the product covered by the existing
patent.99

91 Zeroi, Patent Pending Event: Does the U.S. Patent System Stifle Innovation? An OxfordStyle Debate, YOUTUBE (Nov. 12, 2o13), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H-RFwTCigNc
(statement beginning at 11:02).
92 129 F.2d 161 ( 7 th Cir. 1942).

93 Id. at 164.
94 Id. at 165.
95 See James P. Marsh Corp. v. U.S. Gauge Co., 42 F. Supp. 998, iooo-oi (N.D. Ill. 194),
rev'd, 129 F.2d 161 ( 7 th Cir. 1942).
96 James P. Marsh Corp., 129 F.2d at 166.
97 Id. at 164.
98 Id. at 165.
99 Id.
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Seven months later, in Chicago Steel Foundry Co. v. Burnside Steel
Foundry Co., 100 Judge Evans again wrote a decision overturning an
infringement judgment, this time holding the patent-in-suit invalid for
obviousness. 10 1 Although the accused infringer had done nothing to
invent around the patented invention and the sole issue was the patent's validity, Judge Evans offered the following admitted "digression ' 1 °0 2 to justify the existence of the patent system:
[A]n inventor brings forth an apparatus which is better and made at less
cost than anything heretofore made or used in this field. All competitors
are threatened with loss and perhaps ruin if an equally good product is
not made and sold at prices which meet the new patented product. At
once, the inventive and creative talents of competitors are aroused. They
are spurred to their best efforts to produce, not merely as good, but a better, product, by a new, non-infringing method or apparatus. Thus, instead
of displaying monopolistic traits, the patent fosters competition among inventors and begets new and better products at lesser costs. As a result the
public is the beneficiary. 103
On this view, patents promote "leapfrogging" competition, through
10 4
which technological improvers displace incumbents over time.
Other proponents focus less on easily identified sequential improvement and more on the need to differentiate potential solutions.
William Davis, former Chairman of the Department of Commerce's
Patent Survey Committee, applauded the patent system's "enforced
diversity of innovation" in congressional testimony before the Special
Committee on Atomic Energy in 1946.105 Opposing a proposed compulsory licensing system for all inventions utilizing atomic energy, Davis analogized innovation to a mining prospect and argued that the
best way to develop the prospect would be to diversify search
routes. 10 6 In an uncertain territory, it is efficient to instruct each
member of the search team:

100

132

F.2d 812 (7 th Cir.

'943).

Id. at 818.
102 Id. at 816.
101

103

Id.

104 For a recent statement of the theory, see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Response, Tailoring Incentives: A Comment on Hemel and Oullette's Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEx. L. REV.
SEE ALSO 131, 135 (2014) ("[B]ecause infringement can sometimes cover substantial variations on
the embodiments revealed in the patent, inventing around can ...morph into leapfrogging that is, into the development of superseding inventions that are far superior to the initial advance."). On leapfrogging more generally, see David S. Evans, Antitrust and the New Economy
(ALI-ABA Continuing Legal Education, Sept. 14, 2000) (describing a race in which "firms invest
heavily to displace the leader by leapfrogging the leader's technology").
105 Atomic Energy Act of 1946: Hearings Before the Special Comm. on Atomic Energy, 7 9th
Cong. 6i (1946) (statement of William Davis, Chairman, Dep't of Commerce Patent Survey
Comm.).
106 Id.
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[Do] not follow in anybody else's footsteps; wherever you see footsteps
turn aside and go somewhere else because the natural tendency
of mankind is partly 'sheepish,'... they like to follow other people's
footsteps.
The effect of the patent system in what we might call the lower levels
of invention, is to force diversity. A is a manufacturer of can openers; B is
a competitor. B comes along with a new type of can opener. He gets a
patent on it. A can't copy it, but he still has to stay in the can-opener
business, so he gets busy and gets himself up some new type of can opener,
10 7
and it is usually a little better than B's.

The force of Davis's theory does not depend on sequential improvement. A competing inventor may indeed surpass the patentee, as
Davis envisioned in his can-opener hypothetical, but that point is secondary. More important is that inventing around increases the number of proposed solutions. In an uncertain environment where the optimal solution isn't known ex ante, a diverse set of solutions ensures
the greatest chance of success.108 Thus, even if hindsight reveals that
an invent-around product failed to improve on a particular patented
invention, the system that generated the invent-around is still serving
a useful purpose. Judge Giles Rich, often considered the father of
modern patent law, would later speak of these two benefits as "improvement" and "enrichment."' 10 9 The latter increases the odds of the
former by expanding the range of alternatives.
Many contemporary commentators have agreed that innovation is
improved through a mandatory differentiation mechanism in a problem space large enough to accommodate differentiation. 110 They are
107 Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). The mining metaphor would prove to be an influential one in patent scholarship. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent
System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 27,-75 (1977) (arguing that broad patent scope is preferable be-

cause it allows the patentee to develop an innovation "prospect" without rent dissipation from
competitors, just as property rights over physical prospects reduce rent dissipation during a gold
rush).
108 The classic argument in favor of diverse R&D investments under uncertainty is Richard R.
Nelson, Uncertainty, Learning, and the Economics of ParallelResearch and Development Efforts,
43 REV. ECON. & STAT. 351 (1961).

109 Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability,28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393, 399 (ig6o).
110 See, e.g., F. SCOTT KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 70-71 ( 4 th ed. 2008);
Matthew J. Conigliaro et al., Foreseeabilityin Patent Law, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1045, 1050
& n.17 (200r); Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, Iro MICH. L. REV. 709, 753-54 &

n.248 (2012); Oskar Liivak, Maintaining Competition in Copying: Narrowing the Scope of Gene
Patents, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 177, 214 (2007); Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 40-41 (2ooo). For a particularly extensive discussion, see
SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JU-

18-19 (Comm.
Print 1957) (George E. Frost) (arguing that "the most experienced workers often do not explore
what ought to be explored and doggedly adhere to the thinking of the past," id. at '8, that "society
must positively compel the exploration of alternatives," id. at rg, and that the patent successfully
performs this function because "[e]xisting concerns are forced - upon pain of payment of royalDICJARY, 84TH CONG., THE PATENT SYSTEM AND THE MODERN ECONOMY
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joined by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which in multiple decisions has cited inventing around as a social benefit of the patent system.11 1 There is some soft empirical support for this theory. In
1959, the Patent Law Association of Los Angeles surveyed its clients
about the frequency and effects of inventing around.1 12 Of 282 respondents, 57% said they had attempted to design around another's
patent. 113 Of these respondents, 6i% reported that they had obtained
results superior to the patented invention, and an additional 26% reported that they had obtained items equal in merit. 114 Only I3% reported coming up with inferior devices. 115 Moreover, 75% reported
that invent-around efforts had opened up new fields of R&D, and 78%
made additional inventions during the course of those efforts. 116 Other
1 17
studies have similarly indicated the prevalence of inventing around.
Anecdotal success stories include the VCR, which was the result of an
attempt to circumvent the then-dominant video recording technology;1 1 several recent advances in three-dimensional printing; 119 the flu-

ties or even foreclosure from a successful development - to explore all alternatives with an open
mind," id.).
III See, e.g., TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp., 646 F.3 d 869, 883 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc); Hilton
Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3 d 1512, 1520 (Fed. Cir.) (per curiam), supplemented by 64 F.3 d 675 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (per curiam), rev'd on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1996);
Westvaco Corp. v. Int'l Paper Co., 991 F.2d 735, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc.,
970 F.2d 816, 828 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d '453, '457
(Fed. Cir. i99i); Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control USA, Inc., 775 F.2d 268, 277 (Fed. Cir. 1985); State
Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1235-36 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also Baxter Int'l,
Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 315 F. 3 d 829, 830 ( 7 th Cir. 2003) (describing a patentee's successful manufacturing process that gave a competitor the "incentive to invent around" it, eventually inventing a
process that was "distinct ...but equivalently cheap and effective").
112 Russell M. Otis & Win. Douglass Sellers, Our Patent System Works: A Reply to the Melman
Report, 42 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 295, 324-25 (i96o).
113 Id. at 325. This was defined as "develop[ing] a directly competitive item not covered by the
patent." Id. at 317.
114 Id. at 325.

115 Id.
116 Id.

117 Edwin Mansfield et al., Imitation Costs and Patents:An EmpiricalStudy, 91 ECON. J. 907,
913 (i98i); see also C.T. TAYLOR & Z.A. SILBERSTON, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 183-84 (1973) (reviewing survey data from British inventors showing prevalence of
inventing around); Jessica Silbey, Patent Variation: Discerning Diversity Among Patent Functions, 45 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 441, 464-65 & n.58 (2013) (providing data from qualitative interviews
with inventors and patent attorneys who embrace inventing around as a source of scientific
progress).
118 Richard S. Rosenbloom & Michael A. Cusumano, Technological Pioneeringand Competitive
Advantage: The Birth of the VCR Industry, CAL. MGMT. REV., Summer 1987, at 51, 57-61.
119 Melba Kurman & Hod Lipson, Op-Ed, Why Patents Won't Kill 3 D-Printing Innovation,
LIVESCIENCE (Jul. 29, 2013, 10:25 AM), http://www.livescience.conm38494-3d-printing-and
-patent-protection.html [http://perma.cc/39RJ-B6G8].
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id catalytic cracking process used in modern petroleum production; 120
Zantac, the blockbuster histamine-2 blocker that increased the half-life
and decreased the toxicity of its predecessor, Tagamet; 12 1 inkjet printing; 122 chemical vapor deposition, invented in the course of designing
around Edison's patent on the carbon filament light bulb; 123 and, according to some, the high-pressure steam engine, a previously abandoned (and, as it would turn out, superior) technology revived only in
124
response to a dominant patent over low-pressure systems.
There is another way to characterize the improvement and enrichment benefits ascribed to inventing around: creativity under constraint. The differentiated inventions that result from circumventing a
patent are, to varying degrees, original and appropriate solutions creative solutions - to the same ill-structured problem that the patented invention targeted. Downstream inventors devise those solutions because of patent constraints upstream. Indeed, creativity lies at
the heart of the Seventh Circuit's theory in Chicago Steel Foundry that
the patentee's exclusive control "arouse[s]" the "inventive and creative
talents of competitors. ' 125 Inventing around, then, complicates the argument that more creative choice ensures more creativity. Constraint
can spur creativity, too.
To be sure, inventing around has its critics among patent scholars. 126 Some think that it's more trouble than it's worth. Society may
win, they argue, where an invent-around happens to yield a genuinely
promising alternative solution. The problem is that the circumventing
120 NEWTON CoPP & ANDREW ZANELLA, DISCOVERY, INNOVATION, AND RISK 186-88
(1993); Amos A. Avidan et al., Innovative Improvements Highlight FCC's Past and Future, OIL &
GAS J., Jan. 8, i9go, at 33.
121 JIE JACK LI, BLOCKBUSTER DRUGS 30-33 (2014).
122 HAL R. VARIAN ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 26-27
(2004); Hearings on Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the KnowledgeBased Economy Before Fed. Trade Comm'n 94 (2002) (statement of Prof. Hal Varian).
123 Lemley, supra note iio, at 754; Ron D. Katznelson & John Howells, Inventing-Around
Edison's Incandescent Lamp Patent: Evidence of Patents' Role in Stimulating Downstream
Development I8-I9 (Oct. 9, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://works.bepress.com/cgi
/viewcontent.cgiarticle= 1073&context=rkatznelson [http://perma.cc/G4PC-ZWTL].
124 George Selgin & John L. Turner, Strong Steam, Weak Patents, or the Myth of Watt's
Innovation-Blocking Monopoly, Exploded, 54 J.L. & ECON. 841 (2011). But see Joel Mokyr,
Technological Change, 17001-830, in i THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF BRITAIN SINCE i7oo, at
12, 24 (2d ed. 1994) (providing a historical account, refuted by Professors Selgin and Turner, that
the patentee succeeded in blocking development of the high-pressure steam engine during the life
of the patent).
125 Chi. Steel Foundry Co. v. Burnside Steel Foundry Co., 132 F.2d 812, 816 ( 7 th Cir. '943).
126 For varying degrees of skepticism, see SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW
OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 50-52 (Comm. Print 1958) (Fritz Machlup) [hereinafter Machlup]; Mi-

chael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115, 190-91 (2003); Louis Kaplow,
The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal,97 HARV. L. REV. 1813, i869-7o (1984); Donald
F. Turner, The Patent System and Competitive Policy, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450, 455 (1969).
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invention may be no better, either in immediate impact or in fertility
for future research, than the circumvented one. Where that's the case,
the downstream inventor has simply reinvented the wheel, often at
considerable R&D cost. On this account, the duplicative effort expended to invent around the patent is socially wasteful. Moreover,
even where the effort yields a meaningfully different product, perhaps
those R&D resources would have been better allocated to solving yet
unsolved problems, rather than to solving already solved ones in dif127
ferent ways.
Whether one thinks inventing around improves social welfare depends on whether one expects the enrichment and improvement benefits to dominate the cost of redundant effort. There is good reason to
suspect that they do. 128 Even if they don't, however, the criticism is
beside the point. The worry is not that inventing around is an ineffective creative stimulus. The worry is that inventing around is an expensive creative stimulus. Even taking seriously the concern over duplicative investment, circumventing patent constraint remains a
generative source of original and appropriate solutions to technological
problems.
The copyright literature has mostly neglected a comparable "creating around" theory of expression.12 9 Instead, as the previous section
explained, it treats the law's restraint as an impediment to creativity.
Forcing detours around the copyrighted work doesn't arouse the "creative talents" to which Judge Evans referred in the patent context.
Rather, in Judge Easterbrook's words, it only "slows progress in literature and art ...forcing authors to re-invent the wheel. ' 130 Copyright
theory, far more than patent theory, has romanticized limitlessness.
That romance obviates the need to account for the generative constraints that patent jurisprudence has historically underscored. When
constraint is conceptualized as creativity's opposite, it is hard to have

127 See Machlup, supra note 126, at 51-52.
128 See Lemley, supra note i io,at 753 (arguing that concerns over duplicative investment overstate the likelihood that competitors will "achieve the same end in the same way").
129 In a recent essay, Professor Dan Burk takes the inventing- around analogy in a different direction. He highlights the phenomenon of technologists trying to develop dissemination methods
that circumvent copyright restrictions on transmission mechanisms like cable TV. See Dan L.
Burk, Inventing Around Copyright, iog Nw. U. L. REV. ONLINE 64 (2Q14). This Article centers
on developing substitutes for particular informational goods, while Professor Burk's theory centers on developing substitutes for those goods' distribution platforms.
130 Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7 th Cir. I9go). Other courts have condoned creating around without taking a position on its welfare effects. See, e.g., Eden Toys, Inc. v. Marshall
Field & Co., 675 F.2d 498, 501 (2d Cir. 1982) ("Even if an alleged copy is based on a copyrighted
work, 'adefendant may legitimately avoid infringement by intentionally making sufficient changes in a work which would otherwise be regarded as substantially similar to that of the plaintiff's.' (quoting Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Co., 654 F.2d 204, 210 (2d Cir. i98i))).
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anything good to say about it. One might support the constraint's corresponding upstream incentives, perhaps, but not the constraint itself.
Still, a few scholars have tried. Professor Justin Hughes has argued
that by allowing downstream creators to "borrow some, but not borrow too much, intellectual property laws force creators to express
themselves by differentiating themselves from what has come before. '13 1 That differentiation, according to Hughes, enriches culture in
the long run. Professor Polk Wagner briefly notes a comparison to inventing around in positing that constraint can induce expression
of new information. 132 Professor William Landes and Judge Richard
Posner conjecture that copyright excludability protects famous works
from "congestion externalities" that would destroy their cultural
salience over time. 133 Thus, imitative copyists might oversaturate society with images of Mickey Mouse, to the point where that cultural
good loses its value. 134 To guard against that possibility, they contend,
copyright limits the public's ability to appropriate those goods.
Abramowicz notes a separate economic cost of crowding around the
same expressive works, focusing on the wasteful rent dissipation that
would result from overentry if derivative markets were left open to
all. 135
These analyses are the optimistic exceptions to the rule. None of
them, however, has asked whether constraint can aid creativity. Answering that question moves beyond rational actor models that suppose if we only ratchet up the disincentives to copy, then downstream
creators will find some other way to solve the problem, or maybe some
better problem to solve. Such models run right back into the constraint critique. Supply and demand curves, critics have stressed, do
not describe how creativity works. 136 According to those critics, copyright's disincentives don't redirect creativity. They kill it. If that
much is true, copyright maximalists interested in promoting a creative
culture are on a fool's errand. So long as creativity withers under
copyright constraint and thrives when set free, focusing on monetary
incentives misses the mark.
131 Justin Hughes, "Recoding" Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience Interests, 77
TEX. L. REV. 923, 981 ('999).
132 R. Polk Wagner, Essay, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 1008-09 (2003).
133 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 3, at 222-28.
134 Id. at 225-26.
135 See Abramowicz, supra note 71, at 357-61; cf. Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product
Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212, 263-64 (2004) (arguing that when excess entry occurs, policymakers should "adjust[] the degree of similarity needed to constitute copyright infringement" in
order to push new works further away from existing works).
136 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 2, at 1193; Tushnet, supra note 86, at 522-36; Diane Leenheer
Zimmerman, Copyright as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 29 (2011).
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What is needed, then, is a better understanding of how the creative
mind responds to the imposition of limits. Perhaps creators always
need the widest possible berth of choice to let the imaginative process
play out. Or, as the next Part details, perhaps not.

III. CONSTRAINT AS A SOURCE OF CREATIVITY
Pablo Picasso once stated that "forcing yourself to use restricted
means is the sort of restraint that liberates invention. It obliges you to
13 7
make a kind of progress that you can't even imagine in advance.
The theme that constraint generates creativity runs through many creators' introspections on the process of making culture. Poet Paul Val6ry wrote that restrictions "often encourage inventions that would never
have resulted from complete freedom. '138 Andre Gide, a Nobel Prize
laureate in literature, continued the passage excerpted in this Article's
epigraph by noting that "[a]rt aspires to freedom only in periods of illness, when it would prefer to live easily. Whenever it feels vigorous, it
seeks struggle and obstacle ....
Art is born of constraint, lives
on struggle, dies of freedom. 13 9 Composer Igor Stravinsky similarly
remarked:
[M]y freedom will be so much the greater and more meaningful the more
narrowly I limit my field of action and the more I surround myself with
obstacles. Whatever diminishes constraint, diminishes strength. The more
constraints one imposes, the more one frees one's self of the chains that
shackle the spirit.140

And philosopher Eric Hoffer observed that constraint breeds novelty,
concluding that "[a] society which gives unlimited freedom to the individual, more often than not attains a disconcerting sameness. On the
other hand, where communal discipline is strict but not ruth14 1
less . . . originality is likely to thrive."
Early psychological theories of creativity contradicted this view.
They conceptualized freedom as a vehicle for creativity and constraint
as a vehicle for conformity. 142 This perspective set up a negative linear relationship between limitations and creative output. More of the
former means less of the latter. Characteristic of this view was Professor Morris Stein's statement in 1961 that "[s]ocieties that are full of
'don'ts,' 'shouldn'ts,' and 'mustn'ts"' discourage creativity because
137 FRAN§OISE GILOT & CARLTON LAKE, LIFE WITH PICASSO 57 (1964) (internal quotation
mark omitted).
138 Paul Valery, The Opening Lecture of the Course in Poetics, in 13 COLLECTED WORKS OF
PAUL VALERY 89, 9I (Ralph Manheim trans., 1964).

139 GIDE, supra note i, at 263-64.
140 IGOR STRAVINSKY, POETICS OF MUSIC 65 (Arthur Knodel & Ingolf Dahl trans., 1947).
141

ERIC HOFFER, THE PASSIONATE STATE OF MIND 21 (1955).

142 See R. KEITH SAWYER, EXPLAINING CREATIVITY 17-i8 (2d ed. 2012).

20151

CREATING AROUND COPYRIGHT

I1359

they "restrict freedom of inquiry and autonomy. '' 143 In the 198Os, Professor Teresa Amabile incorporated this freedom-centered conception
'' 1 4 4
of creativity into a model based on creators' "intrinsic motivation.
Her thesis, which has greatly influenced subsequent creativity scholarship, is that people are more creative when motivated primarily by innate interest in a task, rather than a goal imposed by others. 145 Because freedom and personal autonomy increase intrinsic motivation, it
follows that they also increase creativity. 14 6 Amabile theorized that
without the intrinsic motivation that limitlessness affords, creators are
wont to fall back on familiar routines. Creativity, then, must abhor
147
external directives.
Since the early i990s, however, empirical evidence has been mounting that, contrary to the freer-is-better account, certain forms of constraint in fact enhance creativity. Interestingly, Amabile's current
views are not necessarily to the contrary. She has recently observed
that constraint may indeed foster creativity where resources are sufficient to satisfy the constraint and the rules are both clear and challenging.148 External constraint and intrinsic motivation need not be incompatible. Picasso, Valkry, Gide, Stravinsky, and Hoffer may have
been on to something after all.
This Part discusses psychologists' case for constraint's generative
upside. Section III.A examines the basic cognitive mechanisms that
make problem finders and solvers creative. It introduces what some
psychologists have called the Path of Least Resistance theory, in which
limiting access to familiar solutions enhances creative cognition. Sec-

143 Morris I. Stein, Creativity in a Free Society, 41 EDUC. HORIZONS 115, 130 (1963); see also
id. at ig ("To be capable of [creativity], the individual requires freedom - freedom to explore,
freedom to be himself, freedom to entertain ideas no matter how wild and to express that which is
within him without fear of censure or concern about evaluation.").
144 See AMABILE, supra note 30, at 15; Amabile, supra note 31, at 365-66; Teresa M. Amabile,
A Model of Creativity and Innovation in Organizations, io RES. ORG. BEHAV. 123 (1988).
145 On the intrinsic motivation model's influence, see Brent D. Rosso, Creativity and Constraints:Exploring the Role of Constraints in the Creative Processes of Research and Development
Teams, 35 ORG. STUD. 551, 553 (2Q14).
146 The groundwork for this thesis is Professors Edward Deci and Richard Ryan's selfdetermination theory, which relates intrinsic motivation to self-perceptions of freedom. See
EDWARD L. DECI & RICHARD M. RYAN, INTRINSIC MOTIVATION AND SELFDETERMINATION IN HUMAN BEHAVIOR 49 (1985); Edward L. Deci, Effects of Externally Mediated Rewards on IntrinsicMotivation, 18 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 105 (1q71); Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan, The Empirical Exploration of Intrinsic Motivational Processes,
in 13 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 39 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., i98o).
147 See AMABILE, supra note 30, at 120, 176-77, 267; see also Rosso, supra note 145, at 553-54

(summarizing Amabile's conclusions).
148 Teresa Amabile & Steve Kramer, Necessity, Not Scarcity, Is the Mother of Invention,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 25, 2011), http://hbr.org/2orr/o3/necessity-not-scarcity-is-the [http://perma
.cc/S67R-TC 4 Q]. I return to Amabile's important caveats in Part IV.
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tion JJJ.B reviews the burgeoning empirical evidence that certain
forms of constraint enhance creativity.

A. Creativity and the Path of Least Resistance
The basic intuition underlying constraint's emergence as a positive
force in creativity theory is a story of overabundance. The more resources one has, the easier it is to find and solve a problem in a manner that imitates a prior exemplar. Some freedom is critical, but too
149
much of it invites stasis.
This phenomenon stems from creativity's cognitive mechanisms.
According to the influential model developed by Professor Ronald
Finke and his colleagues, problem solving occurs over the course of
two phases.1 5 0 In the initial "generative" phase, an individual develops
"preinventive structures," loose mental representations such as verbal
combinations or visual images that serve as potential precursors to a
solution.1 5 1 He may retrieve these structures directly from memory,
synthesize them by combining other structures, or transfer them analogically from another domain.1 5 2 These structures are necessarily incomplete, sometimes no more than "a mere germ of an idea. '1 5 3 This
is where the second, "exploratory" phase comes in. The individual explores and interprets these structures, feeling out their suitability as solutions to the problem.1 5 4 If that process doesn't yield a satisfactory
solution on the first try, the individual will shuttle back and forth between generating and exploring preinventive structures, updating
those structures with the feedback from each cycle until a solution
emerges. 155
The constraints that govern the appropriateness of the solution affect the structures that individuals will retrieve during the creative

149 See MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI,

CREATIVITY: FLOW AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF

DISCOVERY AND INVENTION 332 (1996) (concluding that "too many resources.., can have a
deadening effect on creativity").
150 See RONALD A. FINKE ET AL., CREATIVE COGNITION 17-20 (1992); Steven M. Smith et
al., ConstrainingEffects of Examples in a Creative Generation Task, 21 MEMORY & COGNITION
837, 837 (1993); Thomas B. Ward et al., Creative Cognition, in HANDBOOK OF CREATIVITY
189, I91-93 (Robert J. Sternberg ed., 1999). While others have further divided creative cognition
into additional steps, see generally, e.g., Mark A. Runco & Ivonne Chand, Cognition and Creativity, 7 EDUC. PSYCH. REV. 243 (1995), the basic framework is similar. See Thomas B. Ward, Cognition, Creativity,and Entrepreneurship,i9 J. Bus. VENTURING 173, 175 (2004) (noting compatibility between models).
151

FINKE ET AL., supra note 15o, at 17, 20.

Id. at 20-21.
153 Ward et al., supra note 15o, at 191.
152

154 See FINKE ET AL., supra note 15o, at 17, 24-26.
155 Id. at 17.
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process.15 6 If there are few constraints, most individuals by default
seek out a prior successful exemplar and work in a top-down fashion
to conform the solution to it.157 Following this path of least resistance
inhibits originality, and hence creativity, by launching a mimetic approach to problem solving. The ultimate product will closely resemble
the exemplar from which it sprang.158 Whether the creator is conscious of it or not, there has been a powerful cognitive constraint at
work all along: the exemplar itself.
Increasing the amount of constraint that the individual must satisfy
breaks the mimetic cycle. Constraint makes it more difficult to retrieve a fully formed exemplar that will remain appropriate to the
task.159 As a result, preinventive structures grow more abstract and
less likely to conjure up a previous solution.160 Rather than conform a
solution to an already well-developed model, the individual must instead consult broader knowledge frameworks and engage in the sort of
conceptual synthesis and analogy that tends to produce original
16 1
ideas.
This approach to creative cognition has come to be known as the
Path of Least Resistance theory. 162 To be sure, there's nothing inherently wrong with following the path of least resistance, as Professor
Thomas Ward, the theory's pioneer, has emphasized. 163 Conforming
solutions to prior exemplars is, in fact, a perfectly efficient way to approach many problems. But it's not a terribly effective route to originality And where the problem solver transfers aspects of the exemplar
to a new context where they are unnecessary or detrimental to the solution, it's not an effective route to appropriateness, either. 164 In the
1970s, for example, Sony almost abandoned plans for the CD on the

ground that an LP-sized digital disc would hold far more music than
most consumers would be willing to pay for. Apparently, the thought
of creating a smaller disc hadn't occurred to the company's engineers. 165 Sony realized its error only when it saw another firm using
156 See Thomas B. Ward, Structured Imagination:The Role of Category Structure in Exemplar
Generation,27 COGNITIVE PSYCH. i, 35 (1994); Ward, supra note 15o, at 183-84.

157 See C. Page Moreau & Darren W. Dahl, Designing the Solution: The Impact of Constraint
on Consumers' Creativity, J. CONSUMER RES., June 2005, at 13, 15; Stokes, supra note 25, at
1o7-o8; Ward, supra note 156, at 35-36; Ward et al., supra note 15o, at 183.
158 See Ward, supra note 156, at 36; Ward, supra note 15o, at 183.
159 Stokes, supra note 25, at io8.
160 FINKE ET AL., supra note 15o, at 3r; Ward, supra note 156, at 36.

161 Ward, supra note 156, at 36.
162 See, e.g., Steve M. Smith & Thomas B. Ward, Cognition and the Creation of Ideas, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND REASONING 459 (Keith J. Holyoak & Robert G.
Morrison eds., 2012).

163 Ward, supra note r5o, at 184.
164 Id. at 185.
165 Id. at 175.
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smaller discs. 166 That error, according to Ward, was probably the
product of path-of-least-resistance thinking. 167 Cognitively, then, creativity is better off under constraints that encourage a more abstract
approach. 168
The next section describes in greater detail a few of the significant
empirical studies that show the theory at work. 169 They indicate that
too little constraint is as bad for creativity as too much, and that certain constraints lead to more creativity than others.
B. EmpiricalStudies
i. Creative Invention Experiments. - In I990, Finke conducted a
pioneering study of creativity under constraint. 170 In a series of controlled experiments, participants were shown a set of fifteen basic
component shapes, including both simple pieces like a sphere or a cylinder and more specialized pieces like a hook or a handle.1 71 They
were then asked to design a useful object using exactly three of those
shapes. 17 2 In an experimental group, participants were randomly assigned their shapes. 17 3 In a control group, participants could choose
17 4
any shapes they liked.
In all groups, participants were given potential categories of objects, such as furniture, toys, or scientific instruments. After they had
finished, a blind panel of judges rated each invention according to its
originality and appropriateness, creativity's constituent parts. 175 Any
object that was rated sufficiently appropriate and original was deemed
176
a creative invention.
In the first study, Finke compared the creativity ratings under three
different conditions: (i) the category was random but the parts were
chosen, (2) the category was chosen but the parts were random, and (3)

166 JOEL ARTHUR BARKER, PARADIGMS 112-14 (1993).

167 Ward, supra note 15o, at 182.
168 Id. at 185.
169 For other empirical work not discussed here, see Roy Yong-Joo Chua & Sheena S. Iyengar,

Creativity as a Matter of Choice: PriorExperience and Task Instruction as Boundary Conditions
for the Positive Effect of Choice on Creativity, 42 J. CREATIVE BEHAV. 164 (2008); and Jacob
Goldenberg et al., Creative Sparks, 285 SCIENCE 1495 (i999). An extensive literature review can

be found in C. Page Moreau & Darren W. Dahl, Constraintsand Consumer Creativity, in TOOLS
FOR INNOVATION 104 (Arthur B. Markman & Kristin L. Wood eds., 2009).
170 RONALD FINKE, CREATIVE IMAGERY: DISCOVERIES AND INVENTIONS IN VISUALIZATION 39-6I (iggo).
171 Id. at 40.
172

Id.

173

Id.
Id.
Id. at 43-44.
See id.

174
175
176

Participants were never specifically instructed to be creative. Id. at 42.
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both the category and the parts were random.17 7 Finke found that the
group that was randomly assigned both category and part designed the
greatest number of creative inventions, while the group whose members were free to choose their own parts generated the fewest creative
inventions.17 The appropriateness of the inventions remained roughly
constant across experimental conditions - it was only originality that
differed. 17 9 Finke hypothesized that being forced to think in unconventional ways about objects and their uses increased creativity. i10
A second study added a variation to the experimental conditions. 8 1
One group was assigned not only object categories, but also specific
object types within those categories (for example, in the furniture category, a subject would be further constrained to designing a chair). Another group was instead assigned a specific function for the object (for
example, in the furniture category, a subject would be further constrained to designing something that could be used by the disabled).
The results demonstrated that certain constraints are less productive
than others. The group that had been assigned an object function
produced about as many creative inventions as the group from the
first study that could choose any function. By contrast, the group that
had been assigned an object type produced fewer than half as many
creative inventions as the group from the first study.182
Finke concluded that as an assigned object grew more specialized,
it became more difficult to design using randomly selected parts. A
broad category like furniture gives enough room for novel structures
that remain useful, but a narrower category contains necessary elements too specific to be satisfied.18 3 The sweet spot was a bounded,
but not too bounded, inventive territory
Finke's studies were some of the first experimental evidence that
an incremental increase in restrictions could enhance creative output.
Notably, however, the experiments did not include a control group
in which both category and object parts could be freely chosen,
which Finke considered to be "trivially unconstrained."' 1 4 To those
who believe maximum creative choice yields maximum creativity, the
matter may not be so trivial. The subsequent experiments discussed
below explore a starker contrast between maximized and minimized
constraint.

177

Id. at 45.

178 Id.
179

Id.

180 FINKE ET AL., supra note 15o, at
181

FINKE, supra note 17o, at 63-81.

182

Compare id. at 67, with id. at 45.

69.

183 Id. at 8r.
184 FINKE ET AL., supra note 15o, at 6o.
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2. Creative Cognition in Toy Design. - Marketing Professors Page
Moreau and Darren Dahl continued Finke's work by examining how
individuals' cognitive processes shift when confronted with constraint.18 5 As in Finke's study, the experiment required participants to
design a product, in this case a toy, by combining various shapes.
Each participant saw a set of twenty shapes but could use only five of
them. The experiment involved two forms of constraint. First, some
participants were allowed to choose their parts, while others were required to accept parts that were randomly assigned. Second, some
participants were permitted to use as many of the selected five parts as
1 6
they wished, while others were required to use all five.
After sketching out and describing the toy design, participants answered a series of questions about the creative process. Those responses measured whether, consistent with path-of-least-resistance
cognition, the participant had used a top-down process of conforming
the design to a known exemplar or had instead used a bottom-up constructive strategy. Finally, a blind panel of product design professionals judged the originality and appropriateness of each design.
Moreau and Dahl found that as the constraints increased, so did
creative cognition. Participants who were randomly assigned their object parts tended to process in an exploratory, creative way, while participants who chose their own parts tended to pursue a goal-oriented
approach based on prior exemplars."l 7 The study also noted a strong
creative synergy between the constraint of being assigned the object
parts and the constraint of having to use all five of them. Participants
who had to contend with both on average employed significantly more
creative processing than others did. 8 8
As creative cognition increased, so did creative output. Deviating
from the path of least resistance made the designs more original
and, to Moreau and Dahl's surprise, did not reduce their appropriateness.1 9 But deviation took a great deal of cognitive effort. "Only
when participants were highly constrained did they abandon a topdown, exemplar-driven approach in exchange for more constructive,
' 190
creative processes.

185 See Moreau & Dahl, supra note 157.
186 Id. at 16.
187 Id. at 17-18.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 18.
190 Id. at 21.
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3. Creative Cognition in Knitwear. - A later study, conducted by
Dahl and Professor Anne-Laure Sellier, contextualized these findings
by answering three open questions: (a) whether maintaining freedom to
choose inputs but moderating the size of the input universe affects creativity; (b) how participants' self-perception of creativity under constraint compares to observers' objective ratings; and (c) whether the
effect of constraint depends on participants' level of experience in the
creative medium. 19 1
The study asked participants to knit a child's scarf. All participants had at least some knitting experience, but those with the highest
skill level were tracked separately from the others. Unlike in previous
experiments, participants maintained freedom to choose their inputs
(in this case, yarn) across all experimental conditions. The researchers
manipulated the constraint variable not by assigning inputs but rather
by changing the size of the input universe. One group could choose
from among twice as many yarns as the other. All participants were
'' 9
instructed to "be creative. 1 2
Professionals involved in knitwear design judged participants' output. They ranked the scarves according to overall creativity as well as
several variables that, as in previous studies, tracked originality and
appropriateness.
Upon finishing the project, each participant also
provided a self-assessment of the scarf's creativity.
The study found that participants' perceptions diverged significantly from those of the observers. 193 Irrespective of experience level, knitters with more yarns perceived their creativity to be greater than did
knitters with fewer yarns. Yet among the experienced knitters, those
with fewer yarns earned higher creativity ratings than those with more
yarns. Among inexperienced knitters, the amount of choice did not
significantly affect creativity in either direction. Contrary to the participants' subjective self-assessment, constraining the universe of options left experienced creators better off and inexperienced creators no
worse off.
"Choice," Dahl and Sellier concluded, "gives consumers the illusion
that the extensive selection of creative inputs will make them more
creative. '' 194 If that illusion holds true outside the lab, then "experienced creator[s] would seek out the largest choice set available" 9
even though their creativity might suffer as a result.1 5

191 Anne-Laure Sellier & Darren W. Dahl, Focus! Creative Success Is Enjoyed Through Restricted Choice, 48 J. MARKETING RES. 996, 1001-02 (2011).
192 Id. at 999.
193 Id. at rooo-or.
194 Id. at 1004.
195 Id.
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4. Design Fixation.- Maximizing the size of choice sets is not the
only way creators may unwittingly subvert their own creativity As
engineering design scholar David Jansson and cognitive psychologist
Steven Smith showed in a famous series of experiments, familiarity
with an existing solution to a problem can cause difficulty conceptualizing alternatives.196 The study tasked advanced undergraduate engineering students with devising as many varied designs of a product as
possible. For each experiment, one group was shown an exemplar of a
possible design; a control group was not. The two groups generated
nearly the same number of designs. But those who were shown the
exemplar showed far less variability across their range of designs, were
less likely to include useful features that the exemplar lacked, and regularly copied the exemplar's flaws.1 97 Despite the instruction to vary
their designs, the students simply hewed to the model. Jansson and
Smith termed this phenomenon "design fixation."
The design-fixation effect has also been discovered among experienced practitioners. When Jansson and Smith ran a similar experiment using professional engineers, they again found that those shown
a prior exemplar tended to conform to it, including its flaws. 198 A subsequent experiment by others found that even engineering design faculty who were aware of design fixation were unconsciously affected by
it in their own product designs. 199
These studies highlight the gravitational pull of precedent. Familiar examples, it turns out, have an exceptionally strong grip on the
human mind - even for those trying to escape them. Of course,
building off of prior solutions is an indispensable part of the creative
process, in science and art alike. Replication of existing product features may be entirely appropriate in a given instance. But not in every
instance. The difficulty posed by design fixation is that individuals
may not consider potential alternatives as thoroughly as they should.
Or, to put it another way, the difficulty posed by design fixation is that

196 See David G. Jansson & Steven M. Smith, Design Fixation, 12 DESIGN STUD. 3 (I99I).
197 Id. at 8-9.
198 See id. at 9.
199 See J.S. Linsey et al., A Study of Design Fixation, Its Mitigation and Perception in Engineering Design Faculty, 132 J. MECHANICAL DESIGN I (2oio). For other recent studies finding
fixation effects, see Carlos Cardoso & Petra Badke-Schaub, The Influence of Different Pictorial
Representations During Idea Generation, 45 J. CREATIVE BEHAV. 130 (2Q11); Evangelia G.
Chrysikou & Robert W. Weisberg, Following the Wrong Footsteps: Fixation Effects of Pictorial
Examples in a Design Problem-Solving Task, 31 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING,
MEMORY, & COGNITION 1134 (2005); and Vimal Viswanathan & Julie S. Linsey, Design Fixation and Its Mitigation: A Study on the Role of Expertise, 135 J. MECHANICAL DESIGN 8
(2013).
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it constrains creators' choices. As Finke predicted, fidelity to prior so00
lutions homogenizes the universe of new solutions.2
There is, however, evidence suggesting that this fixation effect can
be mitigated. A recent replication study using the same exemplars as
Jansson and Smith found that the effect could be reduced by expressly
instructing participants not to reuse particular elements. 2° 1 Like the
law of infringement, these instructions prohibited copying aspects of
the prior solution. The participants who were given the instructions
successfully designed around them, avoiding fixation on the subopti0
mal exemplar.2 2
5. Fieldwork. - To test whether creativity and constraint have the
same relationship in the field as in the lab, management professor
Brent Rosso conducted a three-month ethnographic study at a multinational corporation with significant R&D expenditures. 20 3 He observed the day-to-day dynamic of product and technology development
teams and completed dozens of semi-structured interviews with team
members. 20 4 Rosso's goal was to measure team perception of earlystage creativity under constraint.20 5 Unlike Dahl and Sellier's lab experiment, he did not contrast self-reporting with an objective indicator
of innovative output. 20 6 Nevertheless, his ethnography provides a
thick description of how creative individuals experience various constraints in the real world.
Rosso found that employee perceptions depended on the type of
constraint. Employees responded more positively to restrictions on the
possible solution to a problem ("product constraints"), such as a desired
R&D goal, than to restrictions on the process of reaching a solution
("process constraints"), such as time or personnel.20 7 Constraining the
ends, in other words, aroused more divergent thinking than constraining the means. Where interviewees thought that constraint helped

200 Cf. Smith et al., supra note 15o, at 845 (noting that even though "learning and benefiting
from prior experience is one of the most important human adaptive traits," fixation and other "unintentional" constraints "may be especially limiting to the discovery of novel ideas").
201 See Chrysikou & Weisberg, supra note r9, at 1144. These results contradicted Jansson and
Smith, who had found that instructions did little to curb the fixation effect. See id. (discussing
Jansson & Smith, supra note 196). Professors Evangelia Chrysikou and Robert Weisberg hypothesize that the difference lies in the manner in which instructions were given. While they had
monitored whether individual participants had read the instructions and comprehended them fully, Jansson and Smith had given their instructions in a group setting and did not monitor individual comprehension. Chrysikou and Weisberg concluded that participants are likely to follow such
"defixation" instructions so long as they comprehend them. Id.
202 See id.
203 Rosso, supra note 145.
204 See id. at 556-57.
205 See id. at 561-62.
206 See id. at 580.
207 Id. at 567-70.
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their creative process, they spoke of being stimulated to try something
new, describing the limitation as a provocation to move past the status
quo. 2 s Where they thought that it hurt, they spoke of being confined
20 9
to the status quo.
Significantly, one of the constraints at issue was patent exclusivity,
which Rosso classified as a product constraint.210 In Rosso's interviews, the R&D teams tended to treat intellectual property rules as
"facts of life. '211 Teams indicated that these rules "often help[] to de'212
fine what could even be considered creative in a given domain.
For product and process constraints alike, employee perceptions
also depended on the severity of constraint.
Echoing Finke's
experimental results, Rosso found that perceived creativity thrived
best when constraints were present but not too strong. "[B]oth overabundance and scarcity of constraints," Rosso concluded, "are
2 13
debilitating.
Rosso also discovered that social dynamics shape individuals' attitudes toward the role that constraint plays in the creative process.
Certain group dynamics enabled teams to leverage limitations as motivating challenges, while different dynamics led teams to treat limitations as nuisances.21 4 "How a team interpreted the constraints they
were facing," Rosso determined, "played an important role in whether
those constraints would inhibit or enhance team creativity.' '215 These
findings complement others' conclusions on the contingent role that attitudinal climate plays in moderating constraint's effects. Amabile and
her colleagues found that time pressure enhances creativity when people feel like they are "on a mission," but it inhibits creativity when
they feel like they are "on a treadmill. '216 Similarly, a recent multiindustry survey of ninety-four innovation project teams revealed that,
where a team's climate supported risk-taking and exploration of unusual approaches, teams produced innovative, higher-quality products
under financial resource constraints.217 Where the climate was less
supportive, by contrast, those positive results were absent. 2 18 While
constraints alone did not significantly correlate with innovation, con208 See id. at 572, 576-77.
209 See id.

210 See id. at 566-67, 569. It is not clear whether the R&D teams were contending with product patents alone or with method patents as well.
211 See id. at 567.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 578.
214 See id. at 576-77.
215 Id. at 58o.
216 Teresa M. Amabile et al., Creativity Under the Gun, HARV. Bus. REV., Aug. 2002, at 52, 56.
217 Matthias Weiss et al., Making Virtue of Necessity: The Role of Team Climate for Innovation
in Resource-Constrained Innovation Projects, 28 J. PRODUCT INNOVATION MGMT. 196 (2011).
218 See id. at 203-04.
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straints combined with an environment of "psychological safety and
tolerance of mistakes" did. 2 19 This much should come as no surprise.
We are, reasonably enough, more likely to harness constraints to their
creative advantage when we enjoy the process.
6. Summary. - None of these studies perfectly map on to the restrictions of the copyright system. Their resource constraints draw
clearer lines than does copyright's substantial similarity test or its fair
use doctrine. Moreover, they focus on physical products like toys and
clothes but not on textual content like novels and songs. 220 As guides
for how to approach copyright policy, they are incomplete.
Nevertheless, these studies still shed light on some basic questions.
They tell a Goldilocks tale of creativity and constraint. There can be
too much restriction, but there can also be too little, and somewhere in
between is an amount that is just right. They also suggest that not all
constraints are created equal (or are equally creative). The effect of
limiting creative choice will depend on a combination of factors, including how the limit operates, who is being limited, who is doing the
limiting, and when the limit is imposed. A proper conceptualization of
constraint thus comprises not a single indivisible variable, but rather
an aggregation of multiple characteristics. Those characteristics are
the subject of the next Part.
IV. A

MODEL OF GENERATIVE CONSTRAINT

Thus far, this Article has discussed the intuitive risks and counterintuitive rewards that constraint holds for the creative process. Copyright's incentives/access debate has done a good job recognizing the
risks. Yet it has all but ignored the rewards. On the traditional
account, the total amount of creativity that the copyright system generates is equal to the difference between two variables: the upstream
creative output that copyright protection incentivizes minus the
downstream creative output that copyright restriction suppresses. A
creating-around view recognizes a third variable that the traditional
account overlooks: the downstream creative output that copyright restriction stimulates. My analysis thus supplements the standard upstream incentives justification for copyright protection.
The size of this overlooked variable does not depend on copyright's
incentive effects upstream. The system could provide few incentives
upstream while still generating much creativity downstream, or vice
versa. In theory, if copyright restrictions generate more downstream
Id. at 204.
For discussion of an experimental study examining the effect of information constraints on
software innovation, see infra p. 1396. Even software, however, may be an imperfect analogy for
artistic expression. See infra note 359.
219
220
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creativity than they suppress, they would yield a net creativity gain
even in the extreme scenario in which they fail to incentivize any marginal creativity upstream. According to some, we're much closer to
that extreme than defenders of copyright care to admit. 221 Even assuming that's true, though, copyright constraint could still be defended
if it stimulates enough creativity downstream to pay for itself. Of
course, if the upstream benefits are in fact substantial, then the downstream benefits have less heavy lifting to do. Either way, all downstream effects - gains as well as losses - should be part of the calculus. If we are to take seriously copyright law's mandate "to stimulate
artistic creativity for the general public good, '22 2 we need to begin recognizing the generativity of constraint.
The constraint critique of copyright law emphasizes the importance
of serendipity and unpredictability to the creative process. 2 2 3 Not every step of the creative process is purposive; many of its fruits are unanticipated at the outset. This is profoundly true, so far as it goes. But
this vital serendipity does not come solely from expansive choice.
Roadblocks produce their own serendipities. That is the lesson of inventing around. Roadblocks have given us technologies that no one
224
foresaw at the start.
It is also the lesson Picasso taught when he said that constraint
"obliges you to make a kind of progress that you can't even imagine in
advance. '225
Restrictions can invite problem finding and problem
solving we would not otherwise have thought to pursue. When members of Kanye West's production team could not obtain a license for a
music sample from the owner of a sound recording, they decided to rerecord the sample themselves. 22 6 The resulting track, "All Falls
Down, ' 227 was, in the team's estimation, better off for it.228 After

221 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Copyright as Property in the Post-IndustrialEconomy: A Research
Agenda, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 141, 143; Zimmerman, supra note 136.
222 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
223 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 2, at 1178, 119o-9i; Tushnet, supra note 86, at 542-43.
224 See supra pp. 1354-55.
225 See GILOT & LAKE, supra note 137, at 57 (internal quotation mark omitted) and accompanying text. This phenomenon prompted art critic Clement Greenberg's observation that "the
pressure of the resistance offered by the conventions of a medium of communication" can:
[A]ct to guide and evoke and inspire; it can be an enabling as well as a resistant pressure;
and it guides and enables and evokes and inspires precisely by virtue of its resistance.
Measure in verse and in music, patterns in ballet, ordered necessities of progression in
drama, prose or verse fiction, and movies: These have empowered creation at the same
time as they have constrained it - and because they have constrained it.
CLEMENT GREENBERG, HOMEMADE ESTHETICS 48 (r999).

226 See MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note ro, at r9o. They did, however, have a license from
the publisher that owned the rights to the composition. Id.
227 KANVE WEST, All Falls Down, on THE COLLEGE DROPOUT (Roc-A-Fella Records 2004).
228 MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note ro, at r9o.
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filmmaker David Newhoff was unable to incorporate a cover of The
Shirelles' classic "Tonight's the Night" 229 into a film scene, he discovered a public domain song that he wished he had thought of to begin
with. 23 0 "Because I couldn't have what I thought I wanted in the first
place," he reflected, "I ended up with something much better simply
because I was forced to go look for it. ' ' 231 Without copyright's constraints, we wouldn't have these creations.
Create-around benefits are particularly visible in segments of the
digital sampling world. Professors Kembrew McLeod and Peter DiCola's recent ethnography, though far from a pro-copyright case study,
reports that many DJs find creative inspiration in transcending the
limitations that copyright imposes. 232 One described various layering
techniques he uses to "camouflage" unlicensed samples, which, in his
words, "put[s] some creativity into it as opposed to just straight thievery.''233 A jazz musician praised the technique of another DJ who, in
an effort to avoid licensing, knew how to "take a sound, and turn
it sideways and press it down and stretch it out and move it - to actually take that raw material and create something new. '234 Yet another explained how the challenge of circumventing sampling restrictions makes the music "more beautiful ....
It makes you want to
change that sound because if you just use it then it's theirs and that's
stealing. '235
An ethnomusicological study of copyright's effects on British sampling culture uncovered similar creative practices. 236 Just as some
producers had once found a creative muse in the technological limitations of sampling equipment, so too do they now find a muse in the legal limitations of copyright licensing. One producer explained the exploratory process that copyright encouraged:
In the same way as having a sample, you're imposing those restrictions

upon yourself, and quite often it's the pushing up against those restrictions
and dealing with music that is already completed and using that as the
starting point for something else - it's those restrictions which I think really test and encourage your creativity... So yeah, you tend to take less
obvious bits of records and obviously you hunt for more obscure records,
or you chop something within an inch of its life so even you've forgotten

229 THE SHIRELLES, Tonight's the Night, on TONIGHT'S THE NIGHT (Scepter Records 1961).
230 See Newhoff, supra note i i.
231 Id.
232 See MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note ro, at 194-96.
233 Id. at '95.
234 Id. at r96.
235 KEMBREW MCLEOD, OWNING CULTURE 95 (2o0) (internal quotation marks omitted).
236 See Morey, supra note ro, at 59.
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what you sampled ... The new cautious approach in itself becomes a limitation, but not necessarily a bad one. 2 3 7

For these creators, copyright has a stimulating effect - not necessarily
the upstream version that we're accustomed to, but the downstream
version of creating around.
Obviously, imposing constraint is not a Pareto-optimal fix for cultural production. Professors Lawrence Lessig, James Boyle, Peter
Jaszi, and Patricia Aufderheide, among others, have told powerful stories about missed opportunities inflicted by the copyright system. 238
No one can reasonably deny that copyright restrictions prevent some
creators from producing valuable work. But there would be other
missed opportunities if all copyright restrictions were eliminated. Removing constraint, just like adding constraint, means that some creations will never be made. If serendipity is our lodestar for creativity
policy, limitlessness has no pride of place over limitedness.
The problem with idealizing free culture is not that freedom and
openness always hurt creativity To a degree, they help. The problem,
rather, is that this idealization tells only half the story behind the creative process. Not every constraint is necessarily productive, and we
are right to question whether particular ones help or hurt (a task that I
take up below). But not every freedom is necessarily productive, either. Scholars have rightly spent much time tearing down the romantic narrative of the sole creator. But we should resist the temptation to
replace it with an equally romantic narrative about creative freedom.
That freedom is in some sense an oxymoron. Creators are always under some constraint, whether consciously or not. 239 As the designfixation studies demonstrate, familiarity confers its own powerful but
237

238

Id. (alterations in original).
See, e.g., BOYLE, supra note 5, at 153-59;

LESSIG, supra

note 5, at Io5-o6,

181-82;

PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, CENTER FOR SOCIAL MEDIA, UNTOLD STORIES:
CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIGHTS CLEARANCE CULTURE FOR DOCUMENTARY
FILMMAKERS 7-29 (2004), http://www.cmsimpact.org/sites/default/files/UNTOLDSTORIES

_Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/P639-QJRP].
239 See Robert J. Sternberg & James C. Kaufman, Constraints on Creativity: Obvious and Not
So Obvious, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CREATIVITY 467, 479 (James C. Kaufman &
Robert J. Sternberg eds., 2010) (describing "internal constraints" that impede creativity precisely
because "the individual is usually not even aware that they exist"); Patricia D. Stokes, Creativity
from Constraints: What Can We Learn from Motherwell? From Mondrian? From Klee?, 42 J.
CREATIVE BEHAV. 223, 234 (2008) (arguing that because stylistic conventions constrain any artistic domain, true artistic freedom is left to those experts who "self-impose constraints on their
currently successful solutions"); David Daley, David Byrne: "Do You Really Think People Are Going to Keep Putting Time and Effort into This, If No One Is Making Any Money?," SALON (Dec.
21,

2013, 4:00 PM), http://www.salon.com/2oI3/I2/2i/david-byrne-do-you-really-think-people

_are-going-to keep-putting-time and effort into this if no one is making-any money [http://
perma.cc/CRD9- 3 GZW] (quoting musician David Byrne's perspective that, because art is inherently constrained by its environment, "a lot of creative decisions are kind of made for us, and the
trick is then working creatively within those constraints").
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often hidden constriction.240
Solving an ill-structured problem one
way can inhibit recognition of other solutions and ways to define the
'' 4
problem. "In effect, one becomes a prisoner of one's own expertise. 2 1
An individual can be constrained by prior solutions or by express limits that make reliance on prior solutions less likely. Both limit creative
choice, but at least the latter one promotes originality.
This is the underappreciated dynamism of constraint on expression.
However open our copyright system becomes, creators will always be
constrained. The question is by what: a constraint that promotes creativity, or a constraint that does not? Copyright law will better fulfill
its purpose if those crafting it and critiquing it pay close attention to
the fact that optimizing constraint doesn't necessarily mean minimizing it.
Still - and here's the rub - optimizing doesn't mean maximizing,
either. That fact makes implementing these insights at the policy level
extraordinarily difficult. Even if the ideal amount of constraint is
larger than zero, the exact number remains unknown. That uncertainty quickly evokes visions of a Laffer Curve. 24 2 An increase in constraint yields an increase in creativity - up until a point. Past that
point, however, increasing constraint only reduces creativity. Without
having at least a rough sense of where the creativity-maximization
point lies, we cannot determine whether the existing level of copyright
constraint falls on the left or the right of the curve's crest. If the latter,
then even accepting the proposition that some positive amount of constraint is a good thing, there is still some force to the charge that copyright harms downstream creativity Indeed, after accounting for all
the other constraints in life that creators must face, perhaps creators
are already at or past the ideal point even before copyright enters the
picture. That would mean that any amount of copyright restriction is
too much - leading full circle back to the claim that I questioned at
the outset of this Article: restricting downstream creators through
copyright is at best a necessary evil.

240 See supra p. 1366; see also Sternberg & Kaufman, supra note 239, at 479-80.
241 Sternberg & Kaufman, supra note 239, at 480.

242 The Laffer Curve posits that there exists an optimal tax rate somewhere between o% and
ioo%. At either extreme, the government will collect no revenue. The devil is in the details of
identifying where between o% and ioo% that optimal point lies. Several authors have drawn
analogies between the Laffer Curve and copyright policy framed in terms of incentives rather
than constraint. See, e.g., Salil K. Mehra, Copyright, Control, and Comics: Japanese Battles over
Downstream Limits on Content, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 181, 185-86 (2003); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz,
Wealth Without Markets?, 116 YALE L.J. 1472, 1480-81 (2007) (reviewing YOCHAI BENKLER,
THE WEALTH

OF NETWORKS

(2006));

see also Matt Schruers,

Copyright's Laffer Curve,

or, Why the Republican Study Committee Was Right, DISRUPTIVE COMPETITION PROJECT
(Nov. i9, 2012), http://www.project-disco.org/intellectual-property/1119I2-copyrights-laffer-curve
-or-why-the-republican-study-committee-was-right! [http://perma.cc/ED7V-oVF6].
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One particularly alluring form of this objection focuses on the market for creativity. Insofar as consumers prefer expressive goods that
they deem to be creative, creators seemingly have a private incentive
to constrain themselves even without any legal intervention.243 Moreover, it is presumably the creators, rather than the government, who
have the best information about which restrictions aid their individual
creative processes. If creators have both the incentives and the information necessary to commit to self-restriction, then copyright constraint appears redundant at best and harmful at worst.
Nevertheless, private ordering alone is unlikely to optimize constraint. To begin with, even if audiences desire creativity, it's unclear
that market signals are effective at identifying it. Markets for cultural
goods are susceptible to herd behavior and information cascades in
which successes and failures are driven more by social influence than
by the goods' innate quality.2 4 4 On top of this, to whatever extent
markets do aggregate preferences for creativity, there remains the
problem of managing risk. Creative production is an inherently uncertain process. 2 45 But derivative works like sequels, film adaptations,
and spinoffs will on average be surer bets than the initial works on
which they are based. 246 Because familiar solutions tend to be safer, as
William Davis suggested in his 1946 congressional testimony on the
patent system, 24 7 the rational move will often be to follow another's

243 Cf DYER ET AL., supra note 20, at 78-79 (discussing voluntarily imposed constraints in
developing new business models).
244 See, e.g., DEAN KEITH SIMONTON,

GREAT FLICKS: SCIENTIFIC STUDIES OF CINE-

MATIC CREATIVITY AND AESTHETICS 76-77 (2011) (describing how information cascades
skew the distribution of financial returns on movies and "undermine[] the connection between the
box office figures and cinematic merit," id. at 76); Matthew J. Salganik et al., Experimental Study
of Inequality and Unpredictability in an Artificial Cultural Market, 311 SCIENCE 854, 855-56
(2006) (presenting experimental findings that music ratings are strongly influenced by perceptions
of others' music ratings and conjecturing that experts in cultural markets "fail to predict success
not because they are incompetent judges or misinformed about the preferences of others, but because when individual decisions are subject to social influence, markets do not simply aggregate
pre-existing individual preferences," id. at 856).
245 The risks can range from financial investment, see, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 3,
at 233 (discussing the market for pop music records, where "[w]hich [records] will be hits and
which flops is not knowable in advance"); Jonathan M. Barnett, Copyright Without Creators, 9
REV. L. & ECON. 389, 391 (2Q13) (observing that because "commercial outcomes in creative markets are extremely skewed and unpredictable," those markets are characterized by a high degree
of risk), to social acceptance, see, e.g., MARK A. RUNCO, CREATIVITY 299 (2d ed. 2014)
("[C]reative ideas are sometimes risky... There is ... a risk involved in considering or sharing
ideas, and the more original the idea, the larger the risk.").
246 See EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN, THE BIG PICTURE 142-43 (2005) (discussing the relatively

reliable consistency of franchise films like Jurassic Park and Star Wars); Michael Abramowicz &
John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 394
(2008) ("An initial work will almost certainly face more risk than a derivative work, if for no other
reason than that creators of derivative works will avoid making derivatives of flops.").
247 See supra pp. 1352-53.
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lead. 248 To be sure, intermediaries like movie studios and publishing
houses mitigate this phenomenon somewhat by building riskdiversified portfolios that enable the hits to subsidize the flops. 249 But
within those intermediaries, the individuals responsible may still have
professional incentives not to stick their necks out. An unsuccessful
effort that follows a successful template is generally safer than an unsuccessful attempt that charts an untested course. 250 "Failure is OK,"
one commentator notes, "so long as one fails conventionally. '25 1 In an
environment like that, avoiding the path of least resistance through
self-constraint seems improbable.
Of course, many creators are motivated by nonpecuniary interests. 252 Those creators who prefer risk, who care more about doing
things their own way than about maximizing financial returns or securing a supervisor's approval, are certainly less susceptible to these
incentives to conform. Yet even they aren't assured of identifying and
applying productive constraints consistently. The creative process is
seldom characterized by self-awareness or predictability.253 A threshold difficulty is recognizing how particular constraints affect outcomes.
The creators in the knitwear study, for example, felt that more choice
made their products more creative, even as their audience considered
those products to be less creative. 254 Beyond this information gap, in-

248 Continuing the mining metaphor that Davis and Professor Edmund Kitch each adopted, see
supra pp. 1352-53, one media-economics scholar has observed:
Movie industry executives can be likened to a group of people wandering in a fog, looking for gold nuggets. When one person finds a nugget, others flock to the same area and
search, because that area is more likely to have other, though perhaps smaller, nuggets .... [I]t
is logical ... that when a success is eventually proven, sequels and derivative films flow one after another until the expected marginal revenues from yet another
bad movie fall below the required rate of return.
DAVID WATERMAN, HOLLYWOOD'S ROAD TO RICHES 240 (2005).

249 See Barnett, supra note 245, at 401.
250 For a discussion of how this dynamic plays out in creative industries, see TYLER COWEN,
WHAT PRICE FAME? 144 (2000). Professor Tyler Cowen explains:
When one manager errs, superiors may assume that the manager exhibited poor judgment. But when several managers imitate each other's behavior, and (sometimes) end up
making a common mistake, their superiors are more likely to assume that the world was
too difficult to predict. The attempt to protect and extend reputation thus can stifle
innovation.
Id.
251 Eric Bonabeau, The Perils of the Imitation Age, HARV. BUS. REV., June 2004, at 47; cf.
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND
MONEY 158 (1936) (observing in the context of investment strategy that "it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally").
252 See supra p. 1357.
253 See Sternberg & Kaufman, supra note 239, at 479-80 (describing unconscious "internal constraints" that push individuals to conform, id. at 479); supra p. 1370 (discussing the unpredictability of the creative process).
254 See Sellier & Dahl, supra note 191, at 1004-05.
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dividual creators also face the hurdle of implementation. Even those
who know to avoid the fixation effect still struggle to do so when left to
their own devices. 25 5 Overall, relying exclusively on self-reglation will
likely leave creativity-enhancing constraints on the table.
The limits of self-regulation suggest that nonvoluntary restrictions
can play a generative role. Assessing how well our current copyright
restrictions happen to serve in that role requires a finely grained
understanding of constraint's various moving parts. Conceptualizing
constraint as a function of multiple qualitative variables, rather than
the single variable plotted on a Laffer-like curve, permits a more nuanced analysis of how copyright law affects creativity on the ground.
On this theory, one cannot speak of an optimal quantity of constraint
without first identifying the kind of constraint that is at issue. Yet the
creativity literature has not yet provided such a taxonomy. I address
that gap here by introducing a model of constraint's various elements
and their application to creative expression. Drawing from and synthesizing the work discussed in the previous Part, I unbundle constraint into seven different characteristics: source, target, scope, clarity,
timing, severity, and polarity. This model provides the conceptual
scaffolding for the discussion of particular copyright doctrines in Part
V, as well as for future empirical investigation.
The constraints that are best structured to generate creativity within a given population will be those whose characteristics collectively
satisfy two criteria. First, they should promote variability, that is, differentiation from an existing corpus of exemplars.25 6 A constraint that
encourages replication of the status quo would fail this test, while a
constraint that encourages diversification would pass it.257 Second,
because intrinsic motivation matters, constraints should also promote
engagement. Creators tend to find more inspiration from rules if they
derive satisfaction from following them. 258 Each of constraint's characteristics will be at its generative best when pushing toward variable
products and engaged processes. My theory is that copyright's basic
excludability mechanism promotes variability, pushing creators closer
to the creativity-maximization point rather than away from it. At the
255 See supra p. 1366.
256 See STOKES, supra note 41, at 7-8.
257 See id. at 5-6 (discussing constraints that turn ill-structured problems into well-structured
ones); see also FINKE ET AL., supra note r5o, at 32 (distinguishing between "restrictions that encourage new explorations and considerations, and those that tie one to conventional approaches").
There may be such a thing as excessive variability. Most people appreciate artistic novelty only
up until a point, but no further. Aesthetic development is thus incremental rather than punctuated. See Fromer, supra note 27, at 1479-83. At the same time, it would be foolish to inhibit individuals with innately high variability. Over time, many have come to enjoy Van Gogh's art, Stravinsky's music, and Keats's writing, even if early audiences didn't.
258 See supra p. 1368.
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same time, the mechanism's late-stage enforcement and ambiguous
scope impedes that variability and may sow disengagement as well.
A. Source
It is reasonable to expect that a constraint's impact would depend
on the constraint's origin. Perhaps Schoenberg's productivity under
the strictures of his twelve-tone musical scale would have played out
differently had they been foisted on him rather than voluntarily adopted. And perhaps Shakespeare's success with the sonnet form would
have been different if the form had been dictated by government fiat
rather than by the stylistic conventions of the domain in which he
worked. The first step in analyzing a constraint should be to identify
its source.
A useful analytic tool is Professor Jon Elster's division of artistic
constraints into three categories: invented, chosen, and imposed. 259 An
invented constraint is one that the creator takes on as a strictly voluntary precommitment. Think of Schoenberg's dodecaphony, Man Ray's
rayographs, or Francis Bacon's thrown paint. These are restrictions
that, the creator predicts, will have some positive effect on the expression he produces. A chosen constraint is generated by the genre's stylistic conventions. Shakespeare did not invent the sonnet form, nor
did Mozart invent the sonata form. Each of them, however, adopted
the form's constraints. Of course, some creators may not experience
adherence to particular conventions as much of a choice. But often
enough, compliance is a voluntary act.
Imposed constraints emanate neither from the creator nor from the
expressive domain in which she works. Instead, they are mandated by
outside forces incidental to the genre. 260 If a composer wants to write
a flute concerto, he is stuck with the physical range of the flute. If a
director has a strict budget, she cannot overspend. If a commissioned
artist is given marching orders by a client, he must follow them, at
least on pain of losing the commission.
Copyright's prohibition on reusing protected material is an imposed
constraint. For this reason, analogies to chosen constraints like sonnets and sonatas might seem dubious. Invented and chosen constraints should have an easier time securing creators' buy-in than imposed ones, which bear less expressive significance to those constrained
by them. All other things being equal, we should expect an imposed
constraint to provoke less engagement. Moreover, even within the

259 ELSTER, supra note 14, at 175-76.

260 As Elster notes, there is often a relationship between chosen and imposed constraints, as
technical limitations spill over into stylistic ones. See id. at 176 (discussing early records whose
small physical capacity affected conventions surrounding jazz solos in the prewar era).
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universe of imposed constraints, people might distinguish between
physical incapacity and human agents' directives. Necessity may be
the mother of invention, but maybe not where the necessity extends no
further than another's say-so.
Still, even if this is a distinction with a difference, it is not a dispositive one. The successful experiments discussed in section JJJ.B
involved imposed constraints. There are also historical examples of
creators finding inspiration in working around restrictions that were
entirely of others' making. Hays Code-era filmmakers and Victorian
novelists innovated new ways to convey meaning not in spite of, but
because of, imposed constraints on content. 26 1 James Joyce responded
to censorship with the cryptic yet profoundly influential prose of
Finnegan's Wake. 262 Even the most repressive regimes elicit creative
responses. 263 One does not need to endorse repression as cultural policy to appreciate that the constraints we impose on each other can generate unanticipated and valuable forms of creativity.
Generative yet imposed constraints need not be so dramatic. Artists in creative fields with robust anticopying norms have thrived in
producing new material that adheres to those norms. In stand-up
comedy, for instance, the reputational cost of appropriating others'
jokes stimulates continued innovation in developing new ones. 264 Such
norms are unlikely to propagate in most large-scale creative industries. 265 But law can perform the same function. Innovators can find
261 See id. at 227-33 (exploring how the Hays Code enabled directors to develop new forms of
double entendre, innuendo, and layered meaning); NORA GILBERT, BETTER LEFT UNSAID:
VICTORIAN NOVELS, HAYS CODE FILMS, AND THE BENEFITS OF CENSORSHIP 2 (2o13)

("Rather than being ruined by censorship, the novels written in nineteenth-century England and
the films produced under the Production Code were stirred and stimulated by the very forces
meant to restrain them.").
262 PAUL VANDERHAM, JAMES JOYCE AND CENSORSHIP 59 (r998).
263 See, e.g., Yu Hua, The Spirit of May 3 5 th, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2Q11), http://www
.nytimes.coM2OIi/o6/24/opinion/global/24iht-june24-ihtmag-hua-28.html (offering a Chinese novelist's account of how evading state censorship has "give[n] full rein to the rhetorical functions of
language, elevating to a sublime level both innuendo and metaphor, parody and hyperbole, conveying sarcasm and scorn through veiled gibes and wily indirection. Surely our language has
never been as rich and vital as it is today."); Philippe D. Radley, Censorship as a Creative Stimulus: The Russian Experience, 53 WORLD LITERATURE TODAY 201, 202 (1979) (arguing that,

paradoxically, Russia's censorship policies are responsible for its prominent literary culture).
264 See Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There's No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of IntellectualProperty Norms and the Transformationof Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV.
1787, 1853-54, r857 (2008).
265 See Jonathan M. Barnett, The Illusion of the Commons, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1751,
1754-55 (2010) ("Reputation-driven norms exert no force against one-shot or other participants

that have no rational interest in accumulating reputational capital and ... can be expected to exhibit declining force in general as any market exhibits increased group size, economic values, capitalintensity requirements and variation in innovative capacity"); cf. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 167 (iggi) (arguing that tight-knit
groups are likely to develop strong social norms). Case studies of anticopying norms within
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engagement in inventing around patents, notwithstanding patent law's
status as an imposed constraint.266 Some artists already describe simi267
lar engagement in creating around copyright law.
The actual magnitude of the creating around phenomenon deserves
empirical investigation. At the very least, it is apparent that many artists doubt that copyright law has much to offer the creative process, 268
suggesting significant room for improvement. Even where engagement is low, however, copyright's status as an imposed constraint is
probably not the primary culprit.
B. Target
The constraint's target is the locus of activity or resources that is
constrained. Rosso's process/product dichotomy 269 speaks to this particular element. A constraint on process limits how a given task may
be completed. It could involve money, time, resources, or methodology. Imagine a poet participating in a contest whose rules provide a
tight deadline, prohibit consultation with peers, and require handwritten submissions. The finished poem might be in free verse and on any
subject imaginable, but the poet is nevertheless under several process
constraints. A constraint on product, by contrast, limits the range of
permissible solutions, irrespective of the process of getting there.
Think here of a second poet constricted by the metrical demands of
the chosen genre.
Broadly speaking, all constraints target at least one of these two
categories. But the boundaries between them are porous. What limits
process often limits product, and vice versa. Matisse composed his
cutouts under the process constraint of using scissors and painted paper rather than applying paint directly to a canvas. 270 His product
creative communities have thus tended to focus on close-knit groups. E.g., David Fagundes, Talk
Derby to Me: Intellectual Property Norms Governing Roller Derby Pseudonyms, go TEX. L. REV.
1093, 1133 (2012); Aaron Perzanowski, Tattoos & IP Norms, 98 MINN. L. REV. 5ff, 578 (20f3).
266 See Silbey, supra note i7, at 464-65 & n.58.
267 See supra p. 1336 and pp. 1370-71.
268 See, e.g., PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE ET AL., COPYRIGHT, PERMISSIONS, AND FAIR USE
AMONG VISUAL ARTISTS AND THE ACADEMIC AND MUSEUM VISUAL ARTS COMMUNITIES
26 (2o14), http://www.collegeart.org/pdf/FairUseIssuesReport.pdf

[http://perma.cc/5GSB-VCWV]

(reporting that interviewed artists "typically did not want to think about copyright as they made
their work for fear of it interfering with their creativity"); J.S.G. Boggs, Who Owns This?, 68
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 889, 889 (1993) (providing an artist's account that "I see much in the nature
of the laws sadly lacking in any real understanding of the creative process"); William M. Landes,
Copyright, Borrowed Images, and Appropriation Art: An Economic Approach, 9 GEO. MASON L.
REV. I, I (2000) ("Artists and judges have very different views regarding how the law should treat
appropriation art. The artist perceives legal restraints on borrowing as a threat to artistic
freedom.").
269 See supra p. 1367.
270 Patricia D. Stokes, Crossing Disciplines: A Constraint-Based Model of the Creative
lInnovative Process, 31 J. PRODUCT INNOVATION MGMT. 247, 252 (2o14).
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was inextricably bound up with that process. The same will not be
true of the poet participating in the contest. His time pressures do not
necessarily alter the solution he is pursuing. Thus, there is sometimes,
but not always, a feedback loop between product and process
constraints.
For expressive works, the category of product constraint may be
subdivided further into goal and element.27 1 A goal constraint is the
most foundational criterion for determining what is or isn't appropriate. 27 2 When a goal constraint is widely recognized, it takes the form
of a genre. Thus, a composer may be limited to a Baroque-style concerto, a screenwriter to a romantic comedy, a choreographer to a pas
de deux, or a painter to surrealism. An original goal constraint represents a radical break with existing convention and, if it ends up being
widely adopted, may give rise to a new convention. Element constraints limit the thematic material within the domain that is available
for recasting and recombination. These are the bits and pieces of culture that creators have at their disposal, what Paul Klee figuratively
273
called the "contents of the paint box."
A goal constraint ultimately dictates whether other constraints are
compatible with the project.27 4 Where a goal constraint conflicts with
element or process constraints, something has to give. One must either
find a different problem to solve, or, if feasible, relax the other constraints. This phenomenon explains the result of Finke's second creative invention experiment. When participants struggled to create an
appropriate chair, it was because the goal constraint (a chair) conflicted with an element constraint (the basic object parts available to
them). 275 When that goal constraint was broadened to furniture more
generally, the conflict dissipated.
Copyright law straddles the border between product and process
constraint. At the product level, copyright restricts both goal and element. If my goal is to make the next Rocky film, copyright law tells

271 Here I am modifying Professor Patricia Stokes's typology somewhat. She adds another category, subject constraints, which regulate content and motifs. Stokes, supra note 25, at iog. Because I do not see a material difference between a work's content and its stylistic elements, I conflate the two categories. Stokes also uses a fourth category, task constraint, which is analogous to
process constraint as I use it here. See id. Finally, what I call an element constraint Stokes calls a
source constraint. Id. I avoid that term because of its overlap with source in the sense that I use
it here, to refer to the entity doing the constraining.
272 Stokes has elsewhere referred to goal constraints as criterion constraints. Stokes, supra note
270, at 249.

273 Stokes, supra note 25, at iog (quoting PAUL KLEE, THE DIARIES OF PAUL KLEE, 18981918, at 244 (Felix Klee ed., 1964)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
274 See id.
275 See supra p. 1363.
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me in fairly simple terms that I had best get a license. 27 6 If I merely
wish to use protected material from Rocky as an element of some other
follow-on project, copyright limits the circumstances under which I
may do so. Fair use doctrine grants me the privilege to use copyrighted material under particular circumstances, 27 7 while under other circumstances I am again confined to what the copyright owner will allow.
Product constraint is copyright's most easily recognizable
restriction on creative choice.
The constraint at the process level is subtler. While processes can
be patented, they cannot be copyrighted. 278 Copyright law scrutinizes
what downstream creators make rather than how they make it. That
means no upstream creator has an exclusive right over method. Nevertheless, because of the product/process feedback loop, copyright law
can still place significant constraints on process. Homage and pastiche
are not product goals in themselves; they are paths to get there. How
much of those paths are available depends on how much copyright law
permits. A maximalist copyright law shorn of the fair use defense, the
sctnes dfaire doctrine, 27 9 and other safeguards for borrowing and quotation would cast a long shadow not just over what society creates but
also how society creates. Even a minimalist copyright law that regulated only verbatim reproduction would still restrict processes at the
margin. For some, verbatim reproduction is itself an expressive process. Take Mike Bidlo, whose professed goal is to undermine traditional myths of romantic genius and originality - and whose process
for reaching that goal is to construct exact duplications of canonical
twentieth-century works. 2 0 A minimalist copyright law, let alone existing copyright law, would require him to obtain a license from the

276 See Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 2o643i, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25,

1989).
277 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2Q12). For a comprehensive discussion of these circumstances, see Pamela
Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2009).
278 See r7 U.S.C. § I02(b) (withholding copyright subject matter over, among other things, any
"procedure, process, system, [or] method of operation").
279 The doctrine deems a genre's stock elements to be unprotectable ideas. It provides that "a
copyright owner can't prove infringement by pointing to features of his work that are found in
the defendant's work as well but that are so rudimentary, commonplace, standard, or unavoidable
that they do not serve to distinguish one work within a class of works from another." Gaiman v.
McFarlane, 360 F. 3d. 644, 659 (7 th Cir. 2004) (quoting Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co.,
329 F. 3 d 923, 929 ( 7th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
280 See Mike Bidlo, in r THE GROVE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN ART 266 (Joan
Marter ed., 2011); Nadine Rubin Nathan, Asked and Answered: Mike Bidlo, T MAG. (July 2,
2010, 12:43 PM), http://tmagazine.blogs.nytimes.com/2oro/o7/o2/asked-answered-mike-bidlo
[http://perma.cc/UUS7-R5RU] (discussing Bidlo's "dead ringers" for Warhol's famous Brillo boxes
and other "exact replicas").
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original owners. 2 l The unavoidable effect of any copyright system,
maximized or minimized, is to constrain some range of processes. The
question is which.
Other than Rosso's recent work, there has not been empirical exploration of whether product and process constraints affect creativity
differently. But, as between the two, there is good reason to expect
that product constraints have less downside. To begin with, even if
product constraints stimulate explorations beyond the path of least resistance, Rosso's research suggests that creators tend to remain better
engaged when they feel autonomy over how that exploration may be
conducted. 2 2 In addition, processes are more generative. One can use
the same process to create an endless number of different products.
Society reaps the benefit of that diversified output. If a particular
product is restricted, creators can generate others. But when process is
restricted, so is the entire universe of products that rely on that process. A constraint on process limits far more than does a constraint on
product.
At the product level, copyright targets creations that repeat familiar
expression. That target provides a more direct way of achieving the
variability ends for which creativity scholars value arbitrary constraints. 2 3 The theory of path of least resistance praises constraint because and to the extent that it keeps creators away from the tried and
true. One could achieve that objective obliquely, as experimental researchers have done, by layering constraint targets until the tried and
true loses viability Or one could achieve it simply by defining the
tried and true as the constraint's target. This direct route is more tailored to the creative function of constraint and less likely to be overinclusive. Through its product constraint, copyright law tries to lessen
2 4
the homogenization of creative expression.
Copyright's process constraint is more troubling.
Still, some
amount of it is inevitable. Just how much is a function of the next
component: scope.

281

And obtain a license he does.

See Laura Gilbert, No Longer Appropriate?, THE ART

NEWSPAPER, May 9, 2012, http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/No-longer-appropriate
/26378.
282 See

supra pp. 1367-68.

283 See supra note 257; pp.

1364-65, 1376.

284 This characterization is consistent with Abramowicz's microeconomic theory of the deriva-

tive work right. See Abramowicz, supra note 71, at 357-61; see also ODED SHENKAR, COPYCATS: HOW SMART COMPANIES USE IMITATION TO GAIN A STRATEGIC EDGE 6-io (2010);

Bonabeau, supra note 251, at 45; Marvin B. Lieberman & Shigeru Asaba, Why Do Firms Imitate
Each Other?, 31 ACADEMY MGMT. REV. 366, 372-73 (2006).
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C. Scope
Constraint scope measures how many choices within a domain a
given constraint precludes. It is likely the most difficult element of
constraint to optimize for creativity, not to mention a source of voluminous debate for copyright scholars focused on upstream incentives
and downstream access. 2 5 Beyond the "tight, but not too tight" conclusion, creativity scholars have not made much headway in specifying
ideal constraint scope.
Nevertheless, one fundamental guideline does emerge. Constraint
must not be so broad that it turns an ill-structured problem into a
well-structured one or, worse, a problem whose solution set is null. As
Elster notes, "[clonstraints must leave room for choice. '2 6 Because
variability within constraint is a necessary condition for the cultivation
of originality, architects of constraint must pay close attention to the
number of choices being restricted and the number that remain in the
pool. 2 7 The idea is analogous to the proposal of Professors Rochelle
Dreyfuss and James Evans to limit patentable subject matter to claims
that can be invented around. 2 8 Expressive problem spaces, like technological ones, should be constrained no more than would permit a diversity of solutions.
In the case of literary expression, whose pool is vast, there is often
some leeway. The cost of locking up certain choices is, as Judge

Boudin wrote in Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International,
Inc. ,289 that "subsequent authors treating the same themes must take a
few more steps away from the original expression. ' ' 290 Within many
expressive problem spaces, there is room to take those exploratory
steps. 291 These spaces boast a Chomskyan "discrete infinity" - the
ability to combine and permute discrete units into an endless array of

285 See, e.g., Matthew J. Sag, Beyond Abstraction: The Law and Economics of Copyright Scope

and DoctrinalEfficiency, 81 TUL. L. REV. 187 (2006).
286 ELSTER, supra note 14, at 176.
287 See id.; Johnson-Laird, supra note 16, at 218 (defining creativity as involving "freedom of

choice" that is "made from among options that are specified by criteria").
288 Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & James P. Evans, From Bilski Back to Benson: Preemption, Inventing Around, and the Case of Genetic Diagnostics, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1349, 1372 (2011) (arguing
that the feasibility of inventing around should be a criterion for patentable subject matter, which
would "require both a grasp of the field and an understanding of the patented invention's epistemic significance within it").
289 49 F.3 d 807 (ist Cir. 1995), aff'd, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
290 Id. at 8rg (Boudin, J., concurring). Literary expression stands in contrast to "functional"
expression like software code, which tends to have less space for creating around. Id.; see also
David Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual Property, 65 VAND. L. REV. 677, 713
(2012) (noting that because of the idea/expression dichotomy, "copyrights are much easier to engineer around than patents").
291 See Hughes, supra note 131, at 98i.
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meanings.292 So long as ideas are not copyrightable and the public
domain remains rich, 293 the discrete units that are restricted remain a
small fraction of the cultural universe. If the path of least resistance is
blocked, there remain other paths to try, other opportunities for serendipitous encounters to occur.
The usual rejoinder here is that language matters. "Synonymy is
suspect," Professor Leslie Kurtz reminds us, "and no two terms are
likely to have exactly the same meaning. '' 294 True enough. But that
fact alone is not a reason to privilege the meaning to which one initially defaults over the meaning that one subsequently makes in order to
satisfy a constraint. Indeed, Kurtz's analysis shows how constraint
can sharpen meaning rather than dull it. She points to John Keats's
"Ode to a Nightingale," reflecting on how trite the ideas could be if
conveyed through different language. 295 It is not coincidence that the
elevated expression she praises was restricted by a rigid meter and
rhyme scheme.
The fair use doctrine that has developed over the past two decades
has carved out space for downstream creators who develop transformative adaptations of prior expression.2 96 In doing so, it sets up a regime of selective excludability. Reusing protected expression is neither
categorically restricted nor categorically permitted. Under that regime,
at least as it is usually applied, downstream creators may use whatever
process they wish so long as the product is transformative. This constraint, like the derivative work exclusivity that operates in the background, promotes variability. Courts have sometimes strayed from this
approach, however, and used language suggesting that a process is per
se infringing. 297 Most notoriously, the court in Bridgeport Music, Inc.
292 See NOAM CHOMSKY, NEW HORIZONS IN THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE AND MIND 3
(2000).

293 These are not foregone conclusions, however.

See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 9o6

(2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (attacking majority's holding that Congress may restore copyright
protection to works in the public domain because shrinking that domain "restricts, and thereby
diminishes, Americans' preexisting freedom to use formerly public domain material in their expressive activities").
294 Leslie A. Kurtz, Speaking to the Ghost: Idea and Expression in Copyright, 47 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1221, 1228-29 (1993) (citation omitted). For similar arguments, see Mark Bartholomew &
John Tehranian, An Intersystemic View of IntellectualProperty and Free Speech, 81 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. i, 70 (2013); Cohen, supra note 2, at 1176.
295 Kurtz, supra note 294, at 1229.
296 See, e.g., Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3 d ii7o (9th Cir. 2013); Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3 d
694 (2d Cir. 2013); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3 d 244 (2d Cir. 2006); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3 d 1257 (irth Cir. 2001). Because fair use does much more than promote creativity,
it also protects a number of socially desirable but nontransformative uses, ranging from scholarship to news reporting to web indexing. See Samuelson, supra note 277, at 2555-615.
297 See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 96o F.2d 301, 303 (2d Cir. 1992) (beginning the opinion by noting
that the "key to this copyright infringement suit" was "defendants' borrowing of plaintiff's
expression").
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v. Dimension Films 298 declared, "Get a license or do not sample. ' ' 299
Process constraints of this sort are far broader in scope, and thus far
more problematic, than product constraints. Copyright's restrictions
will remain most generative if courts focus on the accused work rather
than on the artistic practices behind it. The Bridgeport court acted in
the name of doctrinal clarity, an eminently laudable goal in this model,
but that clarity could be achieved more generatively through product
constraint. Admittedly, as I acknowledged in the previous section,
some processes are inevitably intertwined with the fruit that they bear.
But that is not reason for courts to constrain processes unnecessarily.
How broad or narrow constraint scope should be to promote creativity is ultimately a difficult empirical question that psychologists
have yet to resolve. The answer ought to color what kinds of adaptations the fair use doctrine should permit. Until then, it is at least clear
that embracing constraint as a source of generativity is fully consistent
with fair use's basic architecture, along with the idea/expression dichotomy and a capacious public domain.
D. Clarity
Some constraints are clearer than others. The haiku and the sonnet
employ unambiguous rules of meter, stress, and structure. One can
readily discern whether one has complied with those rules. By contrast, many stylistic conventions employ messier standards. Comedy is
expected to have a certain narrative arc, but it's difficult to determine
ex ante precisely when that expectation is met.30 0 Classical style requires a sonata's development section to elaborate on the motives and
themes introduced in the exposition section, yet it gives little guidance
about what constitutes appropriate elaboration.3 0 1 Obscenity occurs
whenever Justice Stewart sees it.302 In this second group of constraints, the corpus generates the criteria, rather than the other way
around.
Creativity researchers who laud the beneficial role of constraints
tend to focus on clear rules. I am not aware of any empirical work
that assesses clarity's significance in the relationship between constraint and creativity. But all else being equal, unclear prohibitions
are likely worse than clear ones. An ambiguous constraint's scope

298 41 o F. 3 d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).

299 Id. at 8oi. While Bridgeport's holding dealt only with substantial similarity, this language
has affected perceptions of fair use. See David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 5o B.C.
L. REV. 139, 153 (2009).
300 See, e.g., ANDREW STOTT, COMEDY i-3 (2d ed. 2014) (describing slipperiness of criteria
for evaluating comedy).
301 THOMAS SCHMIDT-BESTE, THE SONATA 77-79 (2cr1).
302 See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, '97 (i964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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might extend indefinitely, and guessing wrong is often costly. Elster
observes that in former Communist countries, dissident authors sought
clear boundaries from censors because it would enable "writing
around" them; censors refused for precisely the same reason.30 3 While
there may be some speakers willing to engage in expression no matter
the costs, they would presumably be just as willing if the constraints
were clear.30 4 Consistent with this hypothesis, Rosso's fieldwork found
0s
If
that R&D employees appreciated precisely drawn constraints.3
this theory is correct, then unclear prohibitions are more suppressive
downside than generative upside.
Unsurprisingly, the need for brightly drawn boundaries animates
the jurisprudence and commentary on inventing around a patent. The
Supreme Court has recognized that "[a] zone of uncertainty which enterprise and experimentation may enter only at the risk of infringement claims would discourage invention only a little less than
unequivocal foreclosure of the field. 30° 6 It's tough to think outside the
box if you don't know where the box ends.
The same principle should apply to creating around a copyright.
The difficulty is that copyrights, unlike patents, have no delineated
claims defining their periphery. Because infringement doctrines like
substantial similarity, the idea/expression dichotomy, and fair use leave
room for debate about which aspects of a copyrighted work are protected and which are not, creating around can be an uncertain business. 307 Lessig states that fair use is no more than "the right to hire a
303 ELSTER, supra note 14, at 233; JON ELSTER, POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 90 (1993).

304 It is true that ambiguity might mitigate the costs of suboptimal constraint scope. If a constraint were drawn clearly but too narrowly, ambiguity could helpfully broaden it. But what's
doing the useful work in that scenario is the constraint's scope, not its ambiguity; the creator
would be better off with a broad and certain rule, rather than a zone of ambiguity surrounding an
otherwise narrow one.
305 Rosso, supra note 145, at 564 (discussing how "respondents found the definition and clarity
resulting from product requirement constraints to be quite helpful," even though such specificity
"might be expected to be perceived as inhibiting creative possibilities").
306 United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942); see also Nautilus, Inc.
v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2130 (20i4) (explaining that imprecise patent claims
"foster the innovation-discouraging 'zone of uncertainty' against which this Court has warned"
(citation omitted)); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732
(2002) ("If competitors cannot be certain about a patent's extent, they may be deterred from engaging in legitimate manufactures outside its limits .... "); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance
Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938) ("The limits of a patent must be known for ... the encouragement
of the inventive genius of others .... "); In re Bilski, 545 F. 3 d 943, 977 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Newman,
J., dissenting) ("Uncertainty is the enemy of innovation."); Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence
Building, and the Useful Arts, 74 IND. L.J. 759, 791-95 (1999) (discussing virtues of certainty for
invent-around activity).
307 See Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7 th Cir. I9go) (recognizing confusion over the
proper level of generality for analyzing wrongful copying and acknowledging that "[a]fter 200
years of wrestling with copyright questions, it is unlikely that courts will come up with the answer
any time soon, if indeed there is 'an' answer, which we doubt").
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lawyer. 3s0
Other scholars have noted the "false positives" problem
that these uncertain boundaries produce.30 9 Typically, this issue is
framed in terms of mitigating downstream harm: claiming exclusive
rights in anything more than is necessary only exacerbates society's existing loss from the incentives/access tradeoff. But from a creatingaround perspective, uncertain copyright scope has an added layer of
perniciousness. Even if a copyright owner overclaims his actual property right, downstream creators could create around it so long as the
wrongly extended boundaries are clear. That's not optimal, to be sure,
but at least there is some generative payoff. If the boundaries are
fuzzy, however, the chill on create-around efforts compounds the
overclaiming problem. Not only does the upstream creator receive a
windfall, but the downstream constraints become less productive, too.
Clarity, in other words, may not only decrease constraint's costs but
also increase its benefits.
There is some support for this approach in the Supreme Court's
decision in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.310 That case involved a musical
composition deemed not substantially similar to the protected work
and therefore not infringing. In addressing the standards under which
a successful defendant could recover attorney's fees under the Copyright Act, the Court explained that "it is peculiarly important that the
boundaries of copyright law be demarcated as clearly as possible" in
order to "enrich[] the general public through access to creative
works. 3 11 The defendant had achieved that objective by "increas[ing]
public exposure to a musical work that could, as a result, lead to further creative pieces. ' 312 Lower courts have understood this language
to refer to expansion of the public domain.3 13 Yet a successful defense
could conceivably do no more than slice the pie differently between
plaintiff and defendant, who (unless found to be infringing) holds a
copyright on the accused work. Dismissal of the claim would have
distributional consequences as between the litigants, but the size of the
public domain remains constant. An alternative reading is that clear

308 LESSIG, supra note 5, at 187.
309 See Ben Depoorter & Robert Kirk Walker, Copyright False Positives, 89 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 319, 329-32 (2o13). But see Steven J. Horowitz, Copyright's Asymmetric Uncertainty, 79 U.
CH. L. REV. 331 (2012) (arguing that, according to the models developed by behavioral psychologists, downstream users facing potential losses will tend to be risk seeking, rather than risk

averse).
310

51

0

U.S. 517 (1994).

311 Id. at 527.

Id.
313 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Transfer Techs., Inc., 301 F. 3 d 6o8, 6og ( 7 th Cir. 2002) (summarizing
312

Fogerty as having reasoned that "a successful defense enlarges the public domain, an important
resource for creators of expressive works"); Identity Arts v. Best Buy Enter. Servs. Inc., No. C 054656 PJH, 2008 WL 820674, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2008) (same).
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boundaries "lead to further creative pieces"31 4 by enabling createaround efforts. Knowing where the copyright owner's entitlement
ends allows downstream creators to circumvent it.
In sum, the underappreciated benefit of creating around places a
theoretical premium on predictability, something that copyright law
has historically struggled to provide. If that theory is accurate, it
complicates the law's ability to generate creativity downstream.
E. Timing
Acting in concert with clarity, timing refers to the stage at which
the creator learns if she has successfully satisfied the constraint. Like
several other components explored here, timing has not been the subject of empirical study. Elster does, however, offer a useful theoretical
framework. Constraints can be early, middle, or late. 3 15 An early constraint occurs at the moment of creation, such as where an artist applies stylistic conventions in crafting his work. A middle constraint
occurs after creation but prior to public distribution, such as where a
gatekeeper refuses to disseminate the work unless changes are made.
And a late constraint occurs after distribution has already occurred,
such as where an outside regulator decides that a work should be
banned.
Because early constraints afford the most opportunity for creating
3 16
around, they are more generative than middle or late constraints.
An artist who knows the rules of the game from the outset can tailor
his work to those rules. This is why courts in patent cases emphasize
the need for clarity ex ante. 3 17 By contrast, an artist who learns those
rules only after completing the work has wasted his time. True, he
might be able to redo the project knowing now what he did not know
then. But if he anticipates that his initial understanding could be erroneous, he may not attempt to create around in the first place.
For some, copyright is an early constraint. This is the case for media firms. It is also true of the individual DJs who have pushed their
sampling techniques in new directions in an effort to create around
copyright, 31" and, less productively, the documentary filmmakers
whose "clearance culture" has meant a near total refusal to incorporate

314 Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 527.
315 ELSTER, supra note 14, at 229.

Elster's nomenclature is actually the more elegant "up-

stream," "midstream," and "downstream." I depart from it here in order to avoid possible confusion over my own usage of those terms.
316 See id. at 233.
317 See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
318 See supra p. 1371.
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unlicensed material from copyrighted works. 319 Yet for countless others, copyright functions as either a middle or late constraint. Individuals in many creative communities are not especially conscious of
copyright law in the midst of the creative process. They are affected
by its restrictions only after the fact - when gatekeepers like publishers, distributors, and insurers intervene.320 Here, too, copyright constraint functions less generatively than it could. The optimal timing is
early. Greater clarity on the ground, not just in the courts, would go a
long way toward shifting the timing of constraint earlier in the creative process.
F Severity
Every constraint comes with a penalty for breach, some great (say,
for violating political censorship in authoritarian states) and some trivial (for violating an invented constraint that could be discarded at
will). A constraint's impact on creativity will depend somewhat on its
location along a severity spectrum that measures the stakes of noncompliance. Though penalties for expressive activity sometimes involve governmental actors, they operate more frequently on the level
of social norms. An artist who wants to be accepted within a particular stylistic community has to play by certain rules. Failure to adhere
to those rules could mean failure to gain approval from audiences and
32 1
peers. For many, that failure is a powerful penalty.
In short, the choice of sanction matters. That observation may
sound banal to a legal audience. To date, however, there has been no
empirical investigation of how constraint severity influences the creative process. When social scientists speak of a constraint's burden,
they tend to have in mind its scope, rather than its enforcement mech-

319 See generally AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 238; Anthony Falzone & Jennifer Urban,
Demystifying Fair Use: The Gift of the Centerfor Social Media Statements of Best Practices,57 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 337, 340 (2010).

320 See AUFDERHEIDE ET AL., supra note 268, at 26;James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights
Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, i16 YALE L.J. 882, 905 (2007); Jennifer E. Rothman, The
Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 1903 (2007) (discussing
frequent instances in which "gatekeepers in the science, media, and publishing worlds enforce ... customary [clearance] practices and norms" prior to distribution); Jessica Silbey, Harvesting Intellectual Property: Inspired Beginnings and "Work-Makes- Work," Two Stages in the Creative Processes of Artists and Innovators, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2091, 2128-29 (2011)
(concluding based on interview data that "IP as a formal legal entitlement is not clearly present in
the beginning of [creative] endeavors - or even in the early stages of the work," id. at 2128, but
instead "intervenes somewhere in the middle of the professionalization of the individual or business as either (i)an effect on personal or ethical impulses or (2) an external framework imposed
upon the situation by lawyers or business managers," id. at 2 129 (emphases omitted)).
321 For an extensive discussion of social norms' role in constraining creative choice, see KAL
RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY 104-22, 177-79 (2012).
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anism. 3 22 But a toothless constraint, even if broad, would likely have
little impact on creativity.323 At the opposite extreme, it's conceivable
that a narrow but draconian constraint would discourage creative activity without generating much in return. The issue is partly risk
aversion. Individuals might view skirting the constraint's margins as
too perilous, particularly where those margins are not perfectly defined. 3 24 More speculatively, high penalties might also hurt engagement. As sanctions increase and the constraint is perceived to be less
fair, individuals may cease to view creating around as an intrinsically
motivating act. 325 Rather than leverage the constraint for creativity,
they would simply avoid the domain altogether. Others with a higher
risk tolerance might reject the constraint altogether. 326 Thus, even if
one thinks creating around is socially valuable in principle, high sanctions present a significant danger of overdeterrence.
Copyright manages to fall on different sides of this spectrum simultaneously. Formally, the Copyright Act allows steep statutory damages
awards, up to $150,000 per work infringed. 327 Even for those with
meritorious defenses, litigation costs alone are likely prohibitive. 328 On
the other hand, many copyright owners tolerate arguably infringing
downstream reuse, 329 and, perhaps partly as a result, many downstream creators don't pay much attention to those constraints during
the creative process. 330 Those who are most inclined to play with
copyrighted expression often have little interest in learning, let alone
complying with, what copyright demands. The ideal scenario would
require drastically lower penalties, but also drastically higher buy-in
from downstream creators. Without both, creating around may be
limited to the universe of creators who are both copyright conscious
and risk seeking. As I discuss in Part V, decreasing copyright severity
322 See, e.g., ELSTER, supra note 14, at 279; Rosso, supra note 145, at 578.
323 Relatedly, artificial deadlines are less powerful motivators than real ones. See MULLAINATHAN & SHAFIR, supra note 15, at 27 (positing that the ineffectiveness of fake deadlines and fake
tickling share a common psychological bond).
324 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeabilityand Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV.
1569, 1620 (2009) ("The uncertainty of the standard, if anything, is likely to deter potential users... from treading too close to the boundaries of impermissible copying.").
325 See Teresa M. Amabile, How to Kill Creativity, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 77,
83 (discussing how a "climate of fear" within the workplace can undermine employees' intrinsic
motivation).
326 See ELSTER, supra note 14, at 279 (noting that lack of flexibility may be "so severe as to
induce a move to abolish the constraints entirely").
327 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2Q12).
328 See, e.g., PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, RECLAIMING FAIR USE 4-5 (2011);

Depoorter & Walker, supra note 309, at 325.
329 See generally Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 617 (2008).
330 See, e.g., AUFDERHEIDE ET AL., supra note 268, at 26, 28; MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra

note io, at 116-17 (describing interviewees' refusal or unwillingness to pay for licenses, regardless
of copyright law). The distribution process, however, is a different matter. See supra p. 1388.
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is likely to boost creativity not just through the freedoms it opens up,
but also by shoring up the way that its remaining constraints are
perceived.
G. Polarity
Last, and perhaps least important, is the constraint's polarity. A
constraint can be either a positive rule, instructing what must be done,
or a negative rule, instructing what must not be done. In the language
331
of injunctions, constraints are either mandatory or prohibitory.
Copyright law is built on the back of prohibitory constraint. With
332
copythe exception of attribution requirements for some visual art,
right speaks only to what is forbidden, not to what is required. In the
history of cultural expression, by contrast, mandatory constraints
abound. Indeed, most of the analogies I have offered throughout this
Article - metrical verse, compositional structures, plot conventions,
cooking competitions - specify what must be included but not what
must be excluded. One may be tempted to conclude that copyright
constraint is therefore a fundamentally different breed from the constraints under which creators have historically thrived.
Yet on closer inspection, polarity appears not to have a significant
effect on constraint's generativity. Prohibitory constraints inhabit a
variety of artistic domains. Music theory, for example, has several.
Classical practice proscribes the use of parallel fifths or octaves in
voice-leading, as well as doubling the leading tone.3 3 3 Throughout the
medieval and Renaissance periods, prevailing rules of harmony also
forbade the use of an augmented fourth - an interval perceived to be
so dissonant that it was nicknamed the "devil in music" (diabolus in
musica).33 4 Some Islamic art avoided figural imagery, a constraint that
33 5
catalyzed an outpouring of calligraphic and geometric designs.
Lipograms, texts that deliberately omit one or more letters, have been

331 See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 454 F.3 d ro8, 114 (2d Cir. 2006)
(contrasting mandatory and prohibitory injunctions).
332 See 17 U.S.C. § ro6A.
333 Parallel (Consecutive) Fifths, Octaves Definition, THE HARVARD DICTIONARY OF MUSIC 631 (Don Michael Randel ed., 4 th ed. 2003); H.E. PARKHURST, A COMPLETE SYSTEM OF
HARMONY 52 (2d ed. 19o8).
334 Tritone Definition, THE HARVARD DICTIONARY OF MUSIC, supra note 333, at 9r .
335 See, e.g., Geometry and Islamic Art, SIMONS CTR. FOR GEOMETRY & PHYSICS, STONY
BROOK UNIV. (Aug. 17, 20o), http://scgp.stonybrook.edu/archives/984 [http://perma.cc/CHL3
-YWB 7 ]; Stanley Meisler, A Timeless Exhibition with Exquisite Timing, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 29,
2004), http://articles.latimes.coM/2004/aug/29/entertainment/ca-meisler29
[http://perma.cc/HgVK
-SVPL]; Islamic Arts: The ProhibitionAgainst Images, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, http://
www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/295642/Islamic-arts/6183i/The-prohibition-against
-images (last updated Apr. 7, 2014) [http://perma.cc/4GW9-2865].
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around for millennia. 336 In the hands of the right author, this prohibitory constraint stimulates more inventive use of vocabulary, as in
Georges Perec's
300-page novel La Disparition,which avoids the letter
"e" entirely.337 The Hays Code, mentioned above, was chock full of
generative proscriptions on content. 338 Twitter's i 40-character limitation is a prohibitory constraint that has spurred novel expressive styles
339
and, according to many, more focused expression.
In addition, even mandatory constraints can induce prohibitory
ones over the course of creating a work. Earlier choices constrict later
ones, as the route taken precludes many otherwise attractive options. 340 Anyone who has ever written half a rhyming couplet, only to
struggle with how to complete it, has already learned that lesson. So
has anyone who has tried to excise repeated usage of the same phrases
within an article draft. Those of us who have had these experiences
probably can recall instances in which having to circumvent one way
of expressing an idea led to an unanticipated new way. And the expression benefited from that differentiation.
Corroborating this intuition is the fact that many creators succeed
within communities that have developed anticopying norms. 341 For
the reasons described above, these norms aren't likely to spread within
larger industries. But in those industries where they have, individuals
have flourished under the requirement to avoid mimicking predecessors' work. 3 42 To the extent that this phenomenon is generalizable
across creative media, it bolsters the case that prohibitory constraint
can enhance variability without killing engagement. That copyright

336 See Lipogram Definition, THE PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POETRY AND POETICS

8o9 (Roland Greene et al. eds.,

4 th

ed. 2012).

337 See PAUL SCHWARTZ, GEORGES PEREC: TRACES OF HIS PASSAGE 32-33 (1988) (dis-

cussing how Perec's constraints enriched, rather than impoverished, his use of language).
338 See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
339 See TINA SEELIG, INGENIUS: A CRASH COURSE ON CREATIVITY III1-2 (2012) (describing various expressive art forms that Twitter's character limit has generated); Barb Dybwad,
TWEET SUCCESS: Why We Love Twitter's 140 Character Limit, MASHABLE (Aug. 22,
2009, 8:54 AM), http://mashable.com/2009/08/22/twitter-I4o-character-limit [http://perma.cc/TSJ3

-PWWX] (arguing that Twitter's limitations encourage clearer communication because "[w]hen
faced with the need for an economy of language, you're forced to periodically think twice about
what exactly it is you're trying to say"). Biz Stone, a cofounder of Twitter, has been quoted as
saying: "Creativity comes from constraint. That's one of the basic rules of Twitter. That 140
characters seems like a constraint, but look what people have been able to do with it .... "
Allison Stadd, Behind-the-Scenes Look at Twitter Co-Founder Biz Stone's Film with Ron Howard, MEDIABISTRO (Feb. 8, 2013, io:oo AM), http://www.mediabistro.com/alltwitter/biz-stone

-ron-howard b35763 [http://perma.cc/65WW-XKSY].
340 See ELSTER, supra note 14, at 242 ("[E]ach choice made in the creation of a work of art

serves as a constraint on later choices.").
341 See supra p. 1378.

342 See Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 264, at 1855-56.

CREATING AROUND COPYRIGHT

20151

11393

prohibits, rather than mandates, does not make an obvious difference
in the creativity analysis.
V. GENERATIVE INFRINGEMENT DOCTRINES

Recognizing the generativity of constraint opens up a new vista for
assessing copyright's infringement doctrines. Tailored appropriately,
those doctrines can be more than just means to secure incentives upstream. They can also be, in the spirit of Professor John Maguire's
aphorism, a system of wise restraints that make us creative s 4s That
system would doubly fulfill copyright's purpose: incentivizing investment in creativity upstream, and promoting creative problem solving
and finding downstream.
What might such a system look like? In some fundamental ways, it
would look like the system we already have. First, it would place limits on adaptations of protected expression - what we call the derivative work right. Second, it would carve out space for high-variability
products - what we call fair use. And third, because differentiation
from the creator's subjective pool of prior exemplars drives creativity,
it would constrain copying but not chance overlaps with works that
the creator had never encountered - what we call the independent
creation defense. In other ways, however, it would look different. It
would be transparent, easily assessed at the point of creation, and respected by the creative communities that it governs.
In this Part, I examine how changing certain copyright constraints,
and keeping some others the same, may best generate downstream
creativity. My aim is not to offer a unified theory of how to build a
copyright law that would leave the world best off; for that, one would
have to balance creativity gains against the self-expression and
deadweight-loss concerns that this Article has bracketed.3 44 My aim,
rather, is to examine what kind of creativity gains could be added to
the scale.
A. Constraints that Help
Start with what copyright gets right. Copyright law assigns the
ability to prepare derivative works exclusively to the copyright owner.
Others who prepare a derivative work without authorization are not
only infringers, but are also denied any copyright protection in the

343 In 1936, Maguire famously described law as "the system of wise restraints that make men
free." See Viet D. Dinh, What Is the Law in Law & Development?, 3 GREEN BAG 2D 19, 27

('999).
344 See supra note 4.
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original expression that they contribute to the existing work. 345 One
could, however, imagine an alternative system in which the creator of
an unauthorized derivative work would receive copyright protection in
the new incremental expression, but nevertheless remain unable to exploit the derivative work without the original owner's permission.
That way, downstream and upstream creators would have leverage
over each other in bargaining. The downstream creator could not use
the old material without permission, but neither could the upstream
creator use the new material without permission.
Indeed, such an alternative system is precisely how U.S. patent law
handles downstream adaptation. While the Patent Act grants patentees the right to exclude others from practicing the invention, others
remain free to design improvements on it.346 As a result, downstream
inventors who build on patented technology may receive patents on
their incremental improvements, and may then exclude the patentee.
These dueling exclusivities have fueled the phenomenon of "blocking
patents," in which neither party can use the downstream adaptation
without the other's permission, incentivizing bargaining toward effi347
cient cross-licensing.
The possibility of incentivizing similar bargaining over expressive
adaptations has prompted some scholars to call for a "blocking copyrights" regime. 348 Professor Robert Merges suggests that the best explanation for the absence of blocking copyrights is a moral rightsbased policy favoring authors' reputational interests. 34 9 Yet viewed
through the lens of generative constraint, copyright's derivative work
exclusivity has utilitarian appeal as well. The derivative work right
limits individuals' ability to repeat the same expressive solutions as
their predecessors. As I explained in Part IV, this constraint target has
the potential to enhance creativity. It impedes access to the prior exemplars that line the path of least resistance, channeling create-around
expeditions that lead to a more diversified stock of expression. That
expressive diversity ultimately redounds to society's benefit.

345 17 U.S.C. § I03(a) (2012) (providing that "protection for a work employing preexisting mate-

rial in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such material
has been used unlawfully"). For examples of how this rule plays out in practice, see Gracen v.
Bradford Exchange, 698 F.2d 300, 302-03 (7 th Cir. 1983); and Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592
WDKGX, 1989 WL 2o643i, at *8-ii (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 1989).
346 See 35 U.S.C. § '54 (2Q12).

347 See generally Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The
Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75 (1994).
348 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 71, at 1074-77; Kelly Casey Mullally, Blocking Copyrights Revisited, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 57, 65-69 (2013).

349 See Robert P Merges, Comment, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2659 n.i5 (0994).
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Of course, these low-resistance works are not the only ones that the
derivative work right excludes. It also impedes access to some innovative uses of copyrighted content. Translating between languages or
turning a novel into a film, for instance, may involve immense
amounts of creativity, yet these are quintessentially derivative works
within the copyright owner's control.3 0 Audiences lose out on these
works if copyright prevents their production. The question is whether
that loss is offset by gains from creating around, plus whatever marginal upstream activity is incentivized. That question is one that opponents of the derivative work right haven't yet tried to answer.
Thinking about copyright's structure in terms of constraint targets
suggests that the answer could be yes. A blocking copyrights regime
would still impose a constraint, only with a less generative target.
Like existing copyright law, it would prohibit downstream creators
from exploiting copyrighted material without permission. Unlike existing law, however, it would channel them toward producing adaptations that are likely to be cross-licensed. For downstream creators interested in reusing copyrighted material, a blocking copyrights regime
imposes a mandatory constraint requiring them to produce something
attractive to the original copyright owner. That might make for efficient bargaining, but it's a risky creativity policy. Channeling downstream energy toward creating works that fit the copyright owner's vision is not a high-variability proposition.351
Without a derivative work right, we may get more homogenization.352
That's costly if the name of the game is creativity.3 53 The
wider the range of undiscovered appropriate solutions to a problem,
the more audiences may miss out when problem solvers become locked
350 See 17 U.S.C. § ior (including "motion picture version[s]" and "translation[s]" as examples
of derivative works).
351 See Oren Bracha & Talha Syed, Beyond Efficiency: Consequence-Sensitive Theories of
Copyright, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 229, 274 (2Q14) (arguing that copyright owners will tend to
license only those uses that are "conventional [and] mainstream ... rather than a subversive or
experimental variant").
352 See supra section IV.B, 1379-82; see also Abramowicz, supra note 71, at 321 ("[I]n a world
without the derivative right, unauthorized derivative works will tend to be close substitutes for
the authorized derivative works. And they will tend to be even closer substitutes for other unauthorized derivative works."); Hughes, supra note 131, at 942 (arguing that "control spread among
divergent individuals enhances the diversity of meanings in a culture and provides a valuable
barrier against homogenization of ideas").
353 Too much differentiation can also present its own problems. What audiences for creative
expression define as appropriate often limits how much originality creators can get away with;
generally, the sweet spot is new, but not too new. See supra note 257. That audiences tend to prefer differentiation within recognizable stylistic conventions counsels in favor of a robust
idea/expression dichotomy and scenes a faire doctrine. Of course, putting aside concerns over excessive newness, homogenization also has other positive network effects, like shared participation
in culture. But these are analytically separate from, and at some level may work at crosspurposes to, generating creative outputs.
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into a single solution. And if audiences value a multiplicity of solutions separately from the content of those solutions, the cost of that
lock-in is exacerbated. The expressive arts, where appropriateness is
often extremely ill-defined and where audiences desire new works even
though there's nothing wrong with the old ones, check both of those
boxes. To the extent that the derivative work right encourages createaround effort, it furthers - not frustrates - copyright's goal of
"stimulat[ing] artistic creativity for the general public good. '35 4 Thus,
although the current derivative works system constrains more broadly
than a hypothetical blocking copyrights system, it may also constrain
35 5
more wisely.
A recent experimental study on open and closed innovation in
software coding supports this theory.35 6 Participants entered into a
two-week contest to see who could produce the best design for a complex bioinformatics algorithm. In one group, participants submitted
solutions that were then available to all other participants in the
group. Those participants were then free to build off of the existing
solutions. In another group, submissions couldn't be seen by others
until the end of the contest. The study found that when solutions were
available for all to use, participants experimented less and submitted a
more homogeneous set of solutions. 357 While free access to others' solutions enabled iterative improvements, it also instigated more path
dependency, risking lock-in to suboptimal solution paths. 358
The
study's designers concluded that where a problem is susceptible to a
wide range of desirable solutions, closed innovation systems lower the
likelihood that such lock-in will occur. Insofar as expressive domains
tend to feature ill-defined criteria for appropriateness that permit such
a wealth of solutions, copyright's derivative work right may serve a
similar function. By limiting access to certain adaptations, copyright
3 9
encourages diversity in creative expression. 5

354 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
355 This does not necessarily mean that blocking patents are themselves unwise.

One could

make the case that, relative to copyrightable subject matter, patentable subject matter features (i)
less risk that other successful but undiscovered solutions lie outside the path that the patentee has
chosen; and (2) fewer consumers who value differentiation as an independent virtue. These distinctions would make blocking patents more attractive than blocking copyrights. The less concerned we are about finding other paths, the less costly path dependency is.
356 See Kevin J. Boudreau & Karim R. Lakhani, "Open" Disclosure of Innovations, Incentives
and Follow-on Reuse: Theory on Processes of Cumulative Innovation and a Field Experiment in
ComputationalBiology, 44 RES. POL'Y 4 (2Q15).
357 Id. at 21, 24.
358 Id. at 28.
359 To the extent that functional expression like software features a narrower range of potential
solutions for any given problem, experimentation may be less useful and path dependency less
risky. In such cases, convergence around a single search path could be the preferred outcome.
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One might also imagine a system that restricts any use of protected
expression. Section IV.C discussed how such a regime would multiply
constraint scope exponentially, excising not just particular products but
also a host of generative processes. This is no mere hypothetical.
It has already been occurring to varying degrees within several creative industries. 360
Nothing in this Article's constraint model,
the sources from which it draws, or real-life creative practice suggests
that a constraint scope this wide-ranging confers significant benefits
downstream.
Here, of course, is where fair use comes in. I am undoubtedly saying nothing new in recognizing that fair use has a critical role to play
in limiting constraint scope. 3 6 1 The Supreme Court has, after all,
called it the "guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright. ''362 Seldom recognized, however, is that fair use itself confines
creators - in the best possible way. By providing a bounded range of
unlicensed copying that may be conducted, fair use serves as a mandatory constraint on downstream creators just like the hypothetical
blocking copyright would, but with one critical difference. Instead of
steering activity in the same direction as the upstream creator would
go, it steers that activity toward transformation.363 This is the generative constraint target par excellence.
Fair use's emphasis on
transformativeness for adaptive uses is a high-variability restriction on
how individuals may copy from the past. Through its selective excludability, fair use doctrine engenders its own underappreciated form
of creating around.
This selective excludability need not crowd out expressive processes that rely on appropriation from the copyright owner. Instead, it can
push those processes toward variability. It would preserve the discursive community-building that Professors Scott Hemphill and Jeannie
Suk call flocking, while still stimulating differentiation within the
flock. 364 One can celebrate musical remixes, for instance, without celebrating a regime in which every musical remix is categorically privileged. When the DJs discussed in Part IV create around copyright by

See id. at 29-30. The theory described here, like some other copyright theories, may thus be an
uneasy fit for software. Cf., e.g., Fromer, supra note 27, at 1505-o6.
360 See, e.g., AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 238; Gibson, supra note 32o, at 903-04.
361 For a recent encapsulation, see generally AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 328. See also
Samuelson, supra note 277, at 2617 (arguing that the common denominator of all fair uses is limit-

ing the copyright monopoly in ways that promote the public good).
362 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
363 See Balganesh, supra note 66, at 261 (discussing how fair use "signal[s] to potential defendants the range of behavior that will be tolerated before liability is imposed").
364 Hemphill & Suk, supra note 9, at 1152-53 (presenting a theory of flocking and differentiation).
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pushing sampling into ever more playful territory,365 the system is
working.
The possibility of unfair use, fair use's negative space, deters a potential entitlement mentality regarding use of cultural goods. Fair use
offers potential copiers abundance; unfair use guards against overabundance. Courts find that downstream creators making otherwise
transformative use of protected expression cannot copy more than is
reasonable to solve the expressive problem. 366 Fair use guidelines used
within communities of practice encourage individuals to borrow expression, so long as they borrow frugally. 367 And individuals who are
conscious of fair use's limits can harness them as artistic challenges
during the creative process. 3 68 There is such a thing, the doctrine instructs, as too much.
The virtues of trimming expressive excess should be familiar to
most of us. Authors convey themselves more clearly with word limits
than without. A scholar who is forced to distill a single-sentence thesis
tends to write more clearly than one who is not. An idea may remain
muddled unless its proponent is compelled to reduce it to an elevator
pitch. These constraints compel more precise problem definition and
solution. Through its negative space, fair use doctrine works much the
same way. It is copyright law's built-in page count.

365 See supra p. 1371.
366 See, e.g., Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3 d 622, 628-29 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding that although a documentary film's inclusion of historical Elvis television clips was
transformative, the defendants nevertheless infringed because the clips were too extensive, "in
excess of [the] benign purpose" of telling part of the story of Elvis's life, and instead were "simply
rebroadcast for entertainment purposes that Plaintiffs rightfully own"), abrogated on other
grounds by Flexible Lifeline Sys., Inc. v. Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F.3 d 989 (9th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam); Warner Bros. Entm't Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 539-48 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(holding that an unauthorized Harry Potter "Lexicon" had a transformative purpose as a reference
work, but nevertheless infringed by quoting verbatim hundreds of words at a time, "in excess of
its otherwise legitimate purpose of creating a reference guide," id. at 544); cf. Blanch v. Koons, 467
F.3 d 244, 258 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that an artist's copying of the plaintiff's photograph was fair
use where the artist copied "only that portion of the image necessary to evoke 'a certain style of
mass communication').
367 See, e.g., CTR. FOR MEDIA & Soc. IMPACT, CODE OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR
USE FOR POETRY 8 (2cr1), http://www.cmsimpact.org/sites/default/files/documents/pages
/fairusepoetrybooklet singlepg_3.pdf [http://perma.cc/S2WG-HNZN] (explaining that one of the
"key questions" a court will ask is whether "the material taken [is] appropriate in kind and
amount, considering the nature of the copyrighted work and of the use"); id. at io (advising poets
who are considering quoting copyrighted texts that "quotations should be brief in relation to their
sources, unless there is an articulable rationale for more extensive quotation"); see also
AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 328, at 177-85 (asking those considering relying on fair use
to determine their expressive purpose and whether they've taken more than is necessary to accomplish it).
368 See Kleon, supra note 12 (providing poet's account of how fair use's "legal constraints can
actually be turned into artistic constraints," and concluding that "[r]ather than limiting my creativity, these constraints make the poems better.").
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Another conceivable variation on copyright's infringement doctrines is elimination of the independent creation defense. Current law
excuses any overlap between works, even identical ones, so long as
that overlap is fortuitous. 369 In other words, only copying counts. As
Judge Learned Hand memorably explained the matter: "[I]f by some
magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew Keats's
Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an 'author,' and, if he copyrighted
it, others might not copy that poem, though they might of course copy
Keats's. '370 Less improbably, musicians from time to time converge
around substantially similar melodies, forcing courts to determine
whether copying was involved. 37 1 Patent law, by contrast, contains no
such defense. The patentee's exclusive rights are good against the
37 2
world, even against those who independently discover the invention.
Why not offer a similarly robust right to copyright owners? A
number of responses have been offered, pointing to copyright's high
37 4
information costs; 37 3 comparatively minimal eligibility requirements;
37 5
and goal of generating abundant, even if not efficient, expression.
More recently, Fromer has offered a supply-side theory rooted in the
psychology of artistic creativity.37 6 Because audiences value creative
problem finding in the arts, "copyright law places a greater value on
rewarding authors for using their pen to convert their valuable emotional and subjective concepts into an artistic product than on making
377
sure only one problem solution receives the prize of copyright.
The analysis here suggests a separate psychological explanation.
The cognitive mechanisms of creativity require differentiation from
prior models that occupy the problem space that an individual is exploring. 378 By diverging from any such model, individuals are engaged in creative cognition - regardless of whether the fruits of their
cognition resemble the fruits of others' processes. Copyright law reasonably predicts that the surest path to a creative culture is for indi369 See, e.g., Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345-46 (iggi); Mag Jewelry Co. v. Cherokee, Inc., 496 F.3 d 1o8, 116 (ist Cir. 2007); Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3 d 262,
270-71 (2d Cir. 2001).

370 Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936).
371 See, e.g., Jones v. Blige, 558 F.3 d 485 (6th Cir. 2009); Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212
F.3 d 477 (gth Cir. 2000); Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177,
i79-8o (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. '45, 148-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (L.
Hand, J.).
372 See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 477-78 ('974).
373 Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, go VA. L. REV. 465, 529-33
(2004).

374 Dale P. Olson, Copyright Originality, 48 Mo. L. REV. 29, 34 (1983).
375 See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.2.1.1 (3d ed. 2014).
376 See Fromer, supra note 27, at 1492-93.

377 Id. at 1493.
378 See supra section III.A, pp. 136o-62.
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viduals to differentiate themselves from their subjective pools of exemplars. To eliminate the independent invention defense would effectively mandate a single, universal pool. In principle that might be
possible if one could devise a reasonably searchable copyright index,
an almost certainly infeasible task. The practical result would be excessive constraint scope and poor constraint clarity. A constraint that
broad and unclear would dissipate any generative benefit that it might
confer. Requiring differentiation only from the creator's personal path
of least resistance is a far less costly way to induce the creative cognition that copyright law seeks.
B. Constraintsthat Hurt
Despite these positive design features, two aspects of the copyright
system diminish its constraints' usefulness. The first is a question of
clarity and timing. Unpredictable constraints make for predictably
safe expression. It's difficult to create around copyright law effectively
while its boundaries remain hard to locate. The second is a question
of source and severity. Many downstream creators don't engage with
copyright's imposed constraints in a productive way. For most people,
compliance with copyright law will not be intrinsically motivating.
On the problem of uncertainty, a number of scholars have proposed
legislative interventions that would inject some predictability into fair
use, copyright's most famously fuzzy standard. Suggestions have included adding statutory safe harbors for relatively uncontroversial
uses,3 7 9 empowering the Copyright Office to issue nonprecedential advisory opinions in specific cases,38 0 and establishing an administrative
agency to promulgate fair use rules.3 1 l A full evaluation of these individual proposals is beyond my scope here. For my purposes, the important point is that their merits extend beyond reducing transaction
costs or curbing unnecessary wealth transfers from society to copyright
3 2
owners. If adopted, they would also facilitate creating around.
Even if Congress doesn't step into the fray, copyright's clarity is already improving somewhat from within. A growing descriptive literature shows that fair use is clearer than previously thought. 3 3 In addition, industries ranging from documentary film to online video to
media education have implemented codes of best practices that are

379 See Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Essay, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV.
1483 (2007).
380 See Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087 (2007).
381 See Jason Mazzone, Administering Fair Use, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 395 (2009).
382 See supra p. 1386 (arguing that bright lines can increase constraints' benefits downstream).
383 See, e.g., Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-OrientedApproach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1525 (2004); Matthew Sag, PredictingFair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47 (2012); Samuelson,
supra note 277.
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guiding both individual creators and the intermediaries on whom they
3 4
rely toward a better sense of where the constraint boundaries fall.
To be sure, this combination of scholarship and grassroots efforts cannot provide the legal immunity that legislative reform can. But even
so, to the extent that these developments give creative communities
greater confidence in their ability to distinguish between acceptable
and unacceptable borrowings, they still promote a healthier form of
copyright constraint. Such community standards not only improve the
constraint's clarity, but, in so doing, shift its timing as well. As the effect of restriction moves earlier in the creative process, individuals
3 s5
grow better equipped to create around it.
They gain both the freedom that fair use provides and the serendipity of unanticipated cultural encounters that navigating unfair use generates. The more that
copyright law can fuel such line drawing, the more productive copyright constraint will be for downstream creators.
As clarity and timing improve, creators may grow less frustrated
with copyright law as a whole. But much more needs to be done before infringement avoidance becomes a reliable source of intrinsic motivation. The severity and source of copyright constraint loom large
here. In popular perception, copyright law is rotten. The public has
increasingly come to view copyright as heavy-handed corporate protectionism, "a juggernaut" that is "crushing cherished creative and expressive freedoms. '3 6 That perception, combined with the ease of ignoring the law during the act of creation (as distinguished from the act of
distribution, typically controlled by copyright-conscious intermediar3 7
ies), makes this constraint a burden. Engagement is bound to suffer.
While copyright's formal constraints are structured to promote downstream creativity, that potential may lie dormant for many people until
the law does something to shed its negative image.

384 Preliminary results from a 2014 national survey of documentary filmmakers, for example,
indicate that in the vast majority of cases, insurers and broadcasters are comfortable relying on
fair use as long as "they had a letter from a lawyer attesting that the use was fair." CTR.
FOR MEDIA & SOCIAL IMPACT, DOCUMENTARIANS, FAIR USE AND BEST PRACTICES (Oct.
2014),

http://cmsimpact.org/fair-use/related-materials/documents/documentarians-fair-use-and-best

-practices [http://perma.cc/JX86-U8H5]. A decade earlier, before the creation of a statement of
best practices, both filmmakers and intermediaries were more likely to avoid fair uses altogether.
Id. For a review of these statements, see AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 328, at 127-47.
But see Jennifer E. Rothman, Best Intentions: Reconsidering Best Practices Statements in the
Context of Fair Use and Copyright Law, 57 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y USA 37', 376 (2010) (arguing
that codes of best practices often contain "more wishful thinking than reality" and promise more
certainty than existing case law warrants).
385 See supra section lWE, pp. 1388-89.
386 Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Commons, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 2 (2005); see also Jane C.
Ginsburg, Essay, How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 6i (2002).
387 See AUFDERHEIDE ET AL., supra note 268, at 25 (reporting on artists who see copyright as
an impediment to creativity and so choose not to think about it).
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Copyright enforcers and policymakers thus have some rehabilitation work to do before society is likely to see a fully blossomed
creating-around effect. How to go about enacting that reform is a
complex subject in its own right. 3 8 But a good start would be scaling
back some of the "long and strong" excesses that have given copyright
3 9
its bully persona without delivering much incentive value upstream.
Take, for example, copyright's current term length, which in 1998 was
extended from fifty to seventy years past the author's death. 390 Because of discounting to present value, these extra decades do little to
fuel upstream production. 39 1 The term extension's most visible legacy
has not been marginal creative works newly incentivized, but rather a
popular backlash against the entire copyright system. 392 Of course, as
a political matter, any proposal to shorten the copyright term is almost
surely going nowhere. 393 But at least as a normative ideal, a shorter
copyright would be widely perceived as a more legitimate one.
A similar lightning rod is the Copyright Act's statutory damages
scheme, which permits awards of up to $15o,ooo per work infringed
even in the absence of actual damages. 394 These sanctions are unlikely
to be imposed for infringement stemming from downstream adaptation. 3 9 5 Nevertheless, the specter of becoming the occasional exception

388 See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 386, at 61-64; Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96

IOWA L. REV. 1, 15 (2i1); John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the
Law/Norm Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 537, 538.

389 See AUFDERHEIDE &JASZJ, supra note 328, at 16.
390 See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 1o5-298, § 102, 112 Stat. 2827,
2827-28 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.

§§

301-304 (2012)).

391 Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 12, Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. oi-618), 2002 WL 1041846; Robert P. Merges, One Hundred
Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law 19oo-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2 187, 2236-37 (2000)
("From an incentive point of view, the [Copyright Term Extension Act] is virtually worthless;
viewed from a present-value perspective, the additional incentive to create a copyrightable work
is negligible for an extension of copyright from life-plus-fifty years to life-plus-seventy years.").
392 See Ben Depoorter, Essay, The Upside of Losing, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 817, 837-38 (2013)
(describing how a failed constitutional challenge to Congress's extension of the copyright term
"became a symbol representing the darker side of the expansion of intellectual property laws").
393 On the normative desirability yet political infeasibility of a shorter copyright term, see Mark
P. McKenna, Book Review, Fixing Copyright in Three Impossible Steps: Review of How to Fix
Copyright by William Patry, 39 J.C. & U.L. 715, 715-16 (2013). At a minimum, the United
States's entry into the Berne Convention prevents it from dipping below a life-plus-fifty-years
term. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 7, Sept. 9, 1886, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 99-27, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 (amended Sept. 28, 1979).
394 17 U.S.C. § 504(c); see Ben Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1251,
1265 (2011) (recounting "public sentiment that the awards [against individual infringers] are disproportionate and excessive").
395 See AUFDERHEIDE & JASZJ, supra note 328, at 32. But see Rogers v. Koons, 96o F.2d 301,
313 (2d Cir. 1992) (remanding the case to the district court with the observation that, because of
"wilful and egregious behavior," appropriation artist Jeff Koons "may be a good candidate for enhanced statutory damages").
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to the rule chills a great deal of lawful downstream creativity. 396
Commentators today speak of statutory damages in the same breath as
the punitive excesses of Prohibition. 397 Formally excusing creative adaptations from the statutory damages regime (or at least its upper
reaches) could enhance copyright's perception among downstream creators without much risk of losing marginal works upstream.
In addition, educators responsible for copyright training could do
more to explain how copyright restrictions could be leveraged as artistic challenges. There is some precedent for this sort of constraint
"brand management." Creativity scholars have found that intrinsic
motivation remains high, even in the face of extrinsic motivators,
when individuals are expressly told about extrinsic motivation's potential negative effects and the importance of remaining engaged in the
task.398 Society will get more creativity out of the copyright system if
not only copyright scholarship, but also public copyright discourse
more generally, comes to recognize the value of creating around.
CONCLUSION
Constraint has gotten a bad rap. We should not expect that restricting the choice set of downstream creators necessarily restricts
downstream creativity. This Article has argued that, on the contrary,
some amount of restrictiveness is actually desirable. Whether restriction will help or hurt depends on what is restricted, how it is restricted, and how difficult it is to create around.
Drawing from psychological research, I've offered a predictive
model of the surprising ways in which copyright constraint can stimulate downstream creativity, and the not-so-surprising ways in which it
can stifle it. What is needed now is better empirical investigation of
how these effects are actually playing out in individuals' and firms'
creative work. Anecdotal evidence shows that copyright restrictions
are indeed generative for some. But we lack a fine-grained understanding of who is benefiting, who isn't, and what explains the
difference.
Measuring creative output will likely be an ineffective approach.
As copyright scholars well know from trying to assess copyright constraint's downside, "[e]vidence of the works not created because of [li''399
censing] costs is difficult to obtain, as it is evidence of a negative.
396 See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Breathing Space, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 429, 429
(2007) (noting statutory damages' "well-documented" chilling effect).
397 See, e.g., Depoorter et al., supra note 394, at 1269. See generally Donald P.Harris, The New
Prohibition:A Look at the Copyright Wars Through the Lens of Alcohol Prohibition,8o TENN. L.
REV. 1l (2012).
398 See SAWYER, supra note 142, at 8o.
399 Loren, supra note 89, at 14.
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The same is true of constraint's upside. Many creators ignore copyright restrictions, and we don't know what works they might have
created if compelled to create around. On both sides, we can legitimately wonder about the road not taken.
Both ethnography and controlled experimentation geared toward
the model I have presented here could offer clearer windows into how
creative cognition responds to legal constraint. Admittedly, gathering
that data poses a formidable challenge. Creativity and constraint each
have many moving parts. But even under existing empirical uncertainty, utilitarian theories of copyright should at least recognize that
the law's restrictions may have creativity payoffs beyond the upstream
incentives that these theories have traditionally emphasized. Any account of copyright constraint that treats it as a pure cost downstream,
whether worth the corresponding upstream benefits or not, is incomplete. Information may want to be free, but creativity does not.

